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Abstract 
We study the impact of politicians' tenure in office on the outcomes of public procurement. To 
this purpose, we match a data set on the politics of Italian municipal governments to a data set on 
the procurement auctions they administered. In order to identify a causal relation, we apply two 
different identification strategies. First, we compare elections where the incumbent mayor barely 
won another term, with elections where the incumbent mayor barely lost and a new mayor took 
over. Second, we cross-validate these estimates using a unique quasi-experiment determined by 
the introduction of a two-term limit on the mayoral office in March 1993. This reform granted 
one potential extra term to mayors appointed before the reform. The main result is that an 
increase in the mayor's tenure is associated with ``worse'' outcomes: fewer bidders per auction, a 
higher cost of procurement, a higher probability that the winner is local and that the same firm is 
awarded repeated auctions. Taken together, our estimates are informative of the possibility that 
time in office progressively leads to collusion between government officials and a few favored 
local bidders. Other interpretations receive less support in the data 
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1 Introduction
An overriding concern in politics is that politicians who have been in power for too long
might be more likely to develop a set of corrupt relations. This is a very old concern.
Ancient Greeks and Romans used to impose rotation on the most important elective
offices to prevent entrenchment of power. Jacksonians in the 19th century also held the
view that long-term tenure in office fostered corruption (Knott and Miller, 1987).1 Many
modern democracies adhere to this view and thus inhibit apical elected officials from being
in power for too long at both legislative and local level. To the best of our knowledge,
there are no studies proving the causal effect of tenure on the behavior of elected officials.2
In this paper, we document the effect of mayors’ tenure in office on the functioning
of public procurement in Italy. Specifically, we compare the outcomes of procurement
auctions for public works administered by Italian mayors between 2000 and 2005. For
each municipality, we relate the mayor’s tenure to several outcomes of the procurement
process: the number of bidders per auction, the winning rebate, the probability that the
winner is local, and the probability that the same firm is awarded repeated auctions.
A potential threat to the identification of the effect of time in office is that this might
be endogenous. For example, mayors who favor local contractors might survive longer
if the rents accruing from collusive behaviors help them in being reelected. Conversely,
mayors who collude might find it difficult to get reelected if voters punish their unlawful
behavior. To identify a causal relationship, we apply two different identification strategies.
First, we implement a Regression Discontinuity (RD) design by comparing elections
where the incumbent mayor won another term by a small margin with elections where
the incumbent mayor lost by a small margin and a new mayor took over. Mayors elected
in close races are likely to be ex-ante identical in terms of observable and unobservable
characteristics, the only difference being their tenure and, possibly, their procurement
outcomes. Our main results show that one additional term in office not only significantly
1Andrew Jackson was among the first to support the implementation of rotation in office to mitigate
the corruption of long tenured bureaucrats. Prior to Jackson’s stipulation, Thomas Jefferson wrote in the
Resolution for Rotation of Members of Continental Congress 1 that the rotation in office is useful “..to
prevent every danger which might arise to American freedom from continuing too long in office.”
2Besley and Prat (2006) found that, in a cross-country comparison, political longevity is positively
associated with higher levels of corruption.
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reduces the number of bidders participating in the auctions (-11.48%) but also reduces
the winning rebate (-5.7%), which means a higher cost for public works. A back-of-the-
envelope calculation suggests that an average public work (540,000 euros) costs, other
things being equal, about 3,426 euros more in municipalities with a second term mayor
relative to municipalities with a first term mayor. Moreover, we also find that having the
same mayor in power for an additional term increases the probability that the contract is
awarded to a local firm (+5%), or to the same firm repeatedly (+25.6%).
We interpret the fact that RD estimates are larger in magnitude than the OLS estimates
as evidence that voters do understand that reelecting an incumbent mayor might come with
worse public procurement outcomes. If this is the case, why should voters be indifferent
between an incumbent and a challenger in close electoral races, despite knowing that the
former is likely to run a worse procurement? We argue that this evidence could still be
compatible with our RD approach if the outcomes that we measure are not a sufficient
statistic of the overall performance of a mayor, or if incumbents still have an advantage
in the presence of risk-averse voters.
Second, we cross-validate the RD estimates using a unique quasi-experiment deter-
mined by the introduction in March 1993 of a two-term limit on the mayoral office. Since
local elections are staggered across time and regions, the date of the election created two
groups of otherwise comparable mayors: mayors appointed before the reform could be
reelected for two additional terms, while those appointed after the reform for one term
only. Under the assumption that mayors elected just before or after the reform were al-
most identical, we use the distance of the date of the first election from March 1993 as an
instrument for tenure (2SLS). The results from this specification are similar, and provide
a validity check to the RD estimates.
Note that, since the term limit only applied to the terms starting after the reform, we
could obtain estimates of the tenure effect that are purged from the effect of non-eligibility.
In fact, some mayors would eventually face term limit in the third term or more (those
elected for the first time before the reform), while some others in the second term (those
elected for the first time after the reform). This is not the case in most of the studies that
look at the impact of term limit on economic outcomes. Usually, the term limit applies
to everybody with a certain tenure (e.g., the second term), in which case it is not clear
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whether the last term effect is driven by the different experience, or by the absence of
reelection incentives (Besley and Case, 1995; Ferraz and Finan, 2011).3 With this respect,
the two empirical strategies we propose rely on the same heterogeneity in the application
of the term limit to separate the effect of tenure from the effect of non-eligibility, although
they exploit two distinct exogenous variations within the sample of mayors (close electoral
races, and closeness to the 1993 reform, respectively).
It is also important to point out that our focus is on the effect of the elapsed time in
office (tenure), not of the remaining time in office (horizon). As shown in other papers,
the latter is related to the possibility of future opportunities, rather than to the frequency
of past interactions. For example, Gamboa-Cavazos et al. (2008) use firm-level data from
Mexico on extra-official payments made to public authorities and show that corruption
is more intense over long and short political horizons and less intense over intermediate
ones, because of a combination of “horizon” and “capture” effects. Using cross-country
data, Campante et al. (2009) find a similar U-shaped relationship between corruption and
political stability. Our estimates allow us to demonstrate whether two politicians holding
different tenure in office behave differently with respect to public procurement despite
having identical political horizons.
Our findings are compatible with the notion that tenure in office deteriorates the
functioning of the procurement process, as it takes time for mayors and contractors to
establish collusive relationships. We explore possible mechanisms through which a mayor
could interfere with the procurement process. First, we consider whether the size and
the characteristics of the project can be manipulated by mayors with longer tenure. We
find that mayors’ tenure in office does not affect this aspect of the auction design, which
is mainly determined by engineer estimates, and therefore exogenous. Second, over a
subsample of auctions for which the data is available, we find that newly elected mayors
are more likely to replace the bureaucrat who supervises the procurement auctions (Iyer
and Mani, 2012), which suggests a possible channel through which mayors can exert
direct control over the procurement process. In this sense, our estimates seem to validate
Jackson’s view that time in office corrupts.
3An important exception is Alt et al. (2011), who use the variation in the length of gubernatorial term
limits across US states to separately estimate the accountability and the competence effect over taxes,
spending, and borrowing cost.
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One important alternative explanation for our results is that more experienced mayors
are better at mastering the procurement process (Padro´ i Miquel and Snyder, 2006; Dal Bo´
and Rossi, 2011), and so they deliberately favor more expensive bidders because they are
more likely to deliver works with better non-contractible characteristics. We investigate
this possibility and study the delays in the delivery of the public works over a subsample of
municipalities for which the data is available. We find that tenure in office actually implies
higher delays, which reinforces the idea that time in office has a negative impact on the
cost of procurement. A similar argument might also apply to the unobserved quality of the
supplied works, which is not easily contractible. We repeated our analysis on an additional
sample of goods and services purchased by the Italian municipalities. These, unlike public
works, are more standardized in their quality (Bandiera et al., 2009). Still, we find that
tenure in office increases procurement costs, which suggests that the effects we identify in
the main sample should not be confounded by the hidden quality of public works.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the Italian
institutional background, and in Section 3, the data. In Section 4, we explain the identifi-
cation strategy, and in Section 5, we present the main results. In Section 6, we discuss the
results and alternative interpretations of the main evidence. We conclude with Section 7.
2 The Institutional Background
The Italian municipal administration (Comune) is made of a mayor (Sindaco), who super-
vises an executive committee (Giunta), and a council (Consiglio Comunale) that endorses
the policies proposed by the mayor with majority rule. In addition to contracting for
public works, a municipal administration provides public transportation, some welfare
programs, and utilities to the community. On March 27, 1993, the mayoral electoral sys-
tem was changed from party to individual ballot, with a majority premium for the winning
candidate of at least two-thirds of the seats in the council (60% in cities with more than
15,000 inhabitants).4 The same reform also introduced a two-term limit over the mayoral
4The reform was a response to the political crisis that originated on February 1992 from a judicial
investigation (so called “Mani Pulite”) on the corruption of national and local administrators. This
investigation led to not only the dissolution of the Christian Democratic Party (Democrazia Cristiana),
which had ruled the country for over forty years, but also to the end of the so called “Prima Repubblica”
(First Republic).
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office, which only applied to the terms elected after the reform (i.e., past terms in office
did not count).
Municipalities are required to outsource public works and select contractors through
public tenders. During our sample period, the applicable procurement law requires auc-
tions to be sealed-bid and single-attribute (i.e., technical and quality components of the
offers are not evaluated).5 Each auction is administered by a manager, who is appointed by
the mayor among the bureaucrats working in the municipal administration. The manager
supervises the whole procurement process, which entails the following duties: preparing
the preliminary project, advertising the call for tender, administering the auction, paying
the winning firm and monitoring the realization of the work.
Participation to the auctions can be of three types: the Pubblico incanto, where partici-
pation is open to any firm satisfying some minimum technical requirements; the Licitazione
privata, which is similar to Pubblico incanto except that the contracting authority invites
all firms satisfying some technical requirements; or the Trattativa privata, where the con-
tracting authority only invites a restricted number of firms, with a minimum of 15.6 The
choice of a particular participation mechanism depends on the reserve price of the auction
and some other technical components. The reserve price of the auction represents the
maximum price a municipality is willing to pay for a public work. The reserve price also
determines the auction’s publicity requirements, with auctions with a value below 500,000
euros not requiring any publicity. An engineer employed by the municipal administration
sets the reserve price. The reserve price is the result of a calculation of the total costs
required to realize the work computed using a price-list of the standardized costs for each
type of work. Contractual conditions (e.g., the reserve price of the public administration
and the works’ deadlines) are described in the call for tender.
Firms bid the price at which they are willing to do the work in the form of a percentage
reduction (a rebate) with respect to the auction’s reserve price. For a given reserve price, a
5All Italian public administrations had to follow “Legge Merloni”: Legge 109/94 and amendments
(“Merloni-bis” in 1995, “Merloni-ter” in 1998, and “Merloni-quater” in 2002). Major legislative changes
were introduced in 2006, but do not affect our sample.
6The technical requirements for participation must be certified by an external private agency. Other
formats include the Licitazione privata semplificata, which is substantially similar to the Licitazione
privata, and the Appalto concorso, which is only used for works with a high architectural content starting
from 300,000 euros.
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lower rebate represents a higher cost for the public administration. The winning bid (and
the winner of the auction) is determined by the following algorithm. After a preliminary
trimming of the top/bottom 10% of the collected bids, the bids exceeding the average by
more than the average deviation are further excluded, and the winning bid is the highest
among the remaining bids, i.e., the one just below this “anomaly threshold”.7
The Italian auction mechanism is somewhat unconventional, as it has some “beauty
contest” features whereby the highest bidder does not necessarily win.8 The specific
features of the mechanism raise the theoretical possibility that increased participation
need not result in greater competition (Decarolis, 2014). However, Conley and Decarolis
(2015) also show that increased participation may indeed result in more aggressive bidding,
because of competition among cartels and independent bidders. This theoretical result is
consistent with our evidence, which points towards a positive and significant relationship
between the number of bidders and their rebates (i.e., their bidding strategies). Taken
together, theory and evidence suggest that, despite the fact that the auction mechanism is
unconventional, lower participation is pejorative for the auctioneer just as in a conventional
auction.9
Part of the terms of the procurement contract (the time of the work delivery, and
the total cost of the work) might be (ex-post) renegotiated in cases of unforeseen natural
events (like floods, storms, earthquakes, landslides, etc.). According to procurement law,
renegotiations are granted by the auction manager under mayoral approval.10 The award-
7 To illustrate, consider this simple example. In a hypothetical auction, after the trimming of the tails
there are three participants placing the following bids (in the form of a rebate over the reserve price): 10,
14 and 16. The average bid is thus 13.33. The average difference of the bids above this average bid is
1.12. Thus the “anomaly threshold” is 14.44. It turns out that in this case the winning bid is 14, which is
above the average, even if 16% is the highest bidden rebate. See Figure A.1 for a graphical representation
of the algorithm.
8Decarolis (2014) shows the similarities between this auction mechanism and the one used in other
countries like China, Taiwan, Japan, Switzerland, and several US states.
9 This is in line with the experimental study of Chang et al. (2014), documenting that the empirical
bidding functions in the average bid mechanism are statistically indistinguishable from the empirical
bidding functions in first-price auctions. This paper also shows that the average bid mechanism performs
quite well at reducing the price paid by the auctioneer as in conventional first-price auctions. Our evidence
is also in line with the results from Coviello and Mariniello (2014), who use the same Italian data as ours
to show that an exogenous increase in publicity (i.e., the potential competition) increases the number of
bidders and the winning rebates, reducing the cost of public procurement. Figure A.2 reports a positive
correlation between the number of bidders and the minimum, winning and maximum rebate in our sample.
10Bajari and Tadelis (2014) show that a) Californian engineers have heterogeneous propensity of making
renegotiations of procurement contracts; b) engineers are randomly assigned across different contracts.
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ing of public works requires city council approval, full publicity of the call for tender, and
the disclosure of the identity of the bidders (and their bid) after the auction takes place.
Ex-post renegotiations are decided instead by the mayor (or the engineer appointed by the
mayor) and do not require public disclosure, although Italian local media typically devote
much coverage to the execution of public works, including any eventual delay.
3 The Data
We use an administrative data set that includes all Italian mayoral terms elected between
1985 and 2010, which was provided by the Italian Ministry of Interiors (Ministero degli
Interni). The data set contains information on the identity, gender, age, highest edu-
cational attainment, political affiliation, and previous job of the elected mayor. It also
contains information about the legislature, including the exact duration of service, the
reasons for any eventual early termination and the electoral results. Finally, we also have
yearly information at the municipality level about the size of the resident population, the
total revenues and expenditure, plus some demographic characteristics as of 2005, such as
the disposable income per capita.
We combine this mayoral information with a data set about the procurement auctions
administered by each municipality between 2000 and 2005. This is provided by the Ital-
ian Authority for the Surveillance of Public Procurement (Autorita` per la Vigilanza sui
Contratti Pubblici di Lavori, Servizi e Forniture, A.V.C.P.), which collects data on all
procurement auctions for public works with a reserve price greater or equal to 150,000
euros.
The data set includes auction-level information about the number of bidding firms, the
reservation price, the identity of the winning bidder and the type of work. In particular,
the data set allows us to define a large number of procurement outcomes. For our main
analysis, we focus on two sets: the level of competition and the nature of competition. The
level of competition set includes the number of bidders, and the final percentage rebate
over the reservation price. The nature of competition set includes an indicator for whether
the winning firm is registered in the same region of the contracting authority, and the
maximum percentage of works awarded to the same firm per term. This variable is built
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only for terms elected between 1998 and 2003, so we could observe auctions over at least
three years between 2000 and 2005, and is term-invariant. Each procurement auction is
then matched with the corresponding mayoral term, according to the last date allowed for
bids’ delivery.
The initial sample consists of 4,171 cities (out of the existing 8,104) with at least one
auction between 2000 and 2005, and for which we have information on all the relevant
variables (the number of bidders, the reserve price, the winning rebate, the identity of the
winning bidder, and the time the mayor has been in office). To maximize sample size, we
assign the sample mean (or the mode, if a dummy variable) to other variables with missing
data (namely, whether the mayor was born in the city/region, the mayor’s previous job
and highest education level), and include a dummy for missing status for these variables.
This procedure increases our sample by about 8.5% and allows us to obtain more precise
estimates.
In Table 1, we present summary statistics for the sample of municipalities over which
we run the estimation analysis. The final sample is made of 3,878 cities, for a total of
5,481 mayoral terms. Of these, 3,147 are first term mayors, 1,897 second term mayors, 266
third term mayors, 169 fourth term mayors, and 2 fifth term mayors. Table 2 describes
the characteristics of the auctions in the sample, where we excluded a few outliers with
more than 100 bidders. The data includes a total of 28,058 auctions, with an average
of 21 bidders per auction and a mean winning rebate of 12.91%. The winner was a firm
registered in the same city about 12% of the time (71% in the same region), and on average
the highest percentage of auctions within a term awarded to the same firm is 25%. In
only 10% of the cases the selection criterion was the private invitation (Trattativa privata),
while the rest were with open participation (Pubblico incanto or Licitazione privata). The
average size of a public work is relatively small (540,000 euros, in 2000 equivalents). It is
also interesting to note that the number of auctions per year was constant over the period
2000 and 2004 (between 15% and 21% per year), although there are fewer auctions in 2005
when the sample was originally collected.
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4 Identification Strategy
We want to test whether a mayor’s tenure affects the outcome of the procurement auctions
administered in the city. We assume that the outcome of an auction i, managed by a mayor
m, can be specified in the following linear form:
yim = α + βTim + γTLim + δ1Xi + δ2Xm + νim, (1)
where yim is the outcome of the auction; Tim denotes the mayor’s tenure in office at the
time of the bids’ delivery; TLim denotes whether the mayor can be reelected in the term
after the date of the bids’ delivery; Xi is a vector of auction characteristics; Xm is a vector
of mayor and city characteristics; and νim represents the disturbance term, which includes
a mayor’s specific fixed effect ηm and the usual white noise component im. The main
coefficient of interest is β. We perform the analysis at auction level, using for Tim both
the exact time in office at the date of the bids’ delivery, and the term in office.11
Note that in our set-up we could separate the effect of time in office (β) from the effect
of electoral accountability (γ) because terms elected before 1993 were not included in the
computation of the term limit. This is because, in 2000-2005, some mayors would face
term limit when in the second term (those elected for the first time after the reform), while
some others would face term limit when in the third term or more (those elected for the
first time before the reform).12 Specifically, 7.3% (138) of the second term mayors, 18%
(48) of third term mayors, and 11.8% (20) of fourth term mayors could still be reelected,
while the percentage of those who could not be reelected was 92.7% (1,749), 82% (218),
and 88.2% (149), respectively. Furthermore, as the timing of local elections is staggered
across and within regions (to a certain degree, any city has its own electoral schedule,
depending on past events), this provides some heterogeneity across the entire country.
We specify Xi and Xm using the following sets of characteristics. To control for geo-
graphical and municipal effects we include: the resident population in the municipality at
the beginning of the term, to proxy for the number of potential competitors and any other
size effect; a full set of dummies for all the 102 Italian provinces to control for time invari-
ant characteristics at the local level; an indicator for the judicial efficiency at year-region
11We compute cluster adjusted standard errors to allow for a generic mayor-level error component.
12 See Figure A.3 for a graphical intuition.
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level, to control for differences in the quality of local institutions;13 the budget deficit over
the total revenues, to control for the efficiency of the municipal administration; and a set
of indicators for the year of the delivery of the bid, to control for possible time effects. To
address the heterogeneity of the projects, we include: a second order polynomial in the
reserve price of the auction (i.e., the reservation price of the contracting authority) in 100
thousand Euro increments and deflated to year 2000 price level; an indicator of whether
the selection mechanism of the auction was by public participation or by private invita-
tion; and five project type dummies (road, school, building, housing, art). To control for
the characteristics of the mayors, we include: gender; age; four education dummies; four
previous occupation dummies; an indicator for whether the mayor had been appointed
before in any other municipal elective office; and whether the mayor was born in the same
region. Finally, to control for the electoral characteristics of the mayoral term, we include:
two dummies for the mayor’s party (center-left and center-right), the tenure in office of
the mayor’s party (measured in terms), and a dummy for whether the bid was delivered
in the last year before the next scheduled election to capture electoral cycles within terms
and to address the censoring of terms that started before 2000 or were concluded after
2005.
The main concern when estimating the effect of time in office on the outcomes of
public procurement is that time in office might be endogenous. For example, mayors who
are willing to collude might be able to survive longer if the rents produced by collusive
behaviors help them to be reelected. Conversely, mayors who collude might find it difficult
to get reelected if voters punish their unlawful behavior on the ballot. Next, we illustrate
the two strategies we use to address this problem.
4.1 Close Electoral Races
To estimate the causal effect of time in office, we implement a regression discontinuity
design on the Italian municipal elections. The probability of having a mayor reelected for a
second (or more) term in office is a function of the margin of victory in the previous election
(MVim), and has a sharp discontinuity equal to one at the zero threshold, MVim = 0.
13This is computed as the ratio between settled and incoming cases for each regional administrative
court (TAR), and for public works related disputes.
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Incumbent mayors with a margin of victory above zero are reelected, while those below
are not reelected and replaced by a new mayor.
However, the margin of victory itself may be determined by the functioning of the
procurement auctions. We follow Lee’s (2008) example and focus our analysis on mayors
elected in closely contested races.14 Close-race elections have the characteristics that their
outcome is uncertain and the winner is typically determined by elements which are beyond
the candidate’s control (e.g., weather on election day, breaking news, etc.). In these races,
the tenure of the elected mayor is “as if” it has been randomly determined and exogenous
with respect to mayor and city observable and unobservable characteristics. Then the RD
estimand of the effect of time in office is simply the difference in auction outcomes between
mayors with higher tenure and mayors with lower tenure who had won by a small margin.
We parametrically implement the RD by estimating the following equation:
yim = α + βTim + g(MVim) + γTLim + δ1Xi + δ2Xm + νim. (2)
Because of the discrete change induced by the discontinuity design, Tim is the number of
terms in office, MVim denotes the margin of victory of the incumbent mayor, and g(MVim)
is a smooth function that we approximate with a symmetric third order polynomial func-
tion.15 As discussed in Lee (2008), the RD framework also allows us to test for the validity
of the continuity assumption by comparing a set of pre-intervention characteristics for the
treated and the control group. If there were nonrandom selections around the threshold,
we should expect some of these characteristics to differ systematically. To this purpose,
we will also estimate equation (2) considering the pre-intervention characteristics as an
outcome. To further inspect the validity of the continuity assumption, we will look at the
distribution of the margin of victory around the threshold and implement the McCrary
(2008) test.
14See Imbens and Lemieux (2008) for a survey on RD. See also Lee, Moretti and Butler (2004) and Lee
(2008) for empirical studies that have exploited the assignment mechanism generated by the margin of
victory in single-member plurality elections. Closer to our spirit, Ferraz and Finan (2011) use the share
of districts won by a newly elected mayor in a close election against a term limited mayor, to identify the
effect of lack of accountability on corruption in Brazil.
15 In Table A.2 we experiment with different specifications of g(MVim).
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4.2 Distance from the 1993 Reform
To cross-validate the RD estimates, we further exploit the electoral reform approved in
March 1993. As explained in Section 2, mayors elected for the first time before the reform
could stay in office for two terms more (the treated group), while mayors elected for the
first time after the reform could stay in office for one term more only (the control group).
However, we could not directly implement a 2SLS estimate using the time of first election
as an instrument for tenure. In fact, the 1993 reform also introduced another change in the
institutional setting that might have had a direct effect on the way public procurement
auctions were administered, in which case the exclusion restriction does not hold. In
particular, the reform changed the mayor’s electoral rule from party to individual ballot.
This may have induced a different selection among candidates, because the new electoral
system encouraged competition between candidates and reduced party interference with
voting. Although this could be a major concern, it is worth recognizing two things. First,
this selection bias is minimal within the estimation sample, as at 2000-2005 all the mayors
had gone through at least one individual ballot election. Second, while the term limit
applied sharply after the reform, the introduction of individual ballot elections probably
had a delayed effect on candidates’ selection, since it was initially difficult for parties to
recruit suitable candidates for the new system. If this is true, we can reduce the bias from
the changing electoral rule by focusing on mayors elected immediately before and after
the 1993 reform (i.e., a fuzzy-RD).
Following the above discussion, we re-estimate equation (1) within a 2SLS framework.
As an exclusion restriction in the first-stage, we use an indicator for whether or not the
mayor was elected for the first time before March 1993, augmented with a function of the
distance of the first election from the discontinuity threshold as follows:
yim = α + β1Tim + β2f(distm) + γTLim + δ1Xi + δ2Xm + νim (3)
and,
Tim = a+ b1PRm + b2g(distm) + γTLim + c1Xi + c2Xm + eim (4)
where Tim is the number of terms in office, PRm indicates whether or not the date of the
first election was before March 27, 1993, distm is the time distance of the first election
from the reform, and f(.) and g(.) are flexible functions. Since the running variable is not
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continuous, as elections are held at few points in time, we specify f(.) and g(.) as a series
of time dummies. To be sure that no one in the sample could be reelected for a second
term before the implementation of the reform, this estimate is calculated for the sample of
mayors elected for the first time between five years before and four years after the electoral
reform.16 This procedure delivers a final sample of mayors in the second term (with or
without a binding term limit) and in the third term. The 2SLS framework also allows us
to test for the validity of the exogeneity assumption by comparing a set of pre-intervention
characteristics for the treated and the control group (Lee, 2008). If there was nonrandom
selection around the 1993 reform, we should expect some of these characteristics to differ
systematically.
5 Empirical Evidence
5.1 OLS Estimates
In Tables 3 and 4, we report the OLS results from fitting equation (1) to the data. In
columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 we use consecutive years in office at the time of the bids’ delivery.
In columns 2, 3, 5, and 6 we also include an indicator of whether the term limit is binding
or not, in addition to the full set of observable characteristics discussed in Section 4. In
columns 3 and 6, we replace the number of years with the number of terms in office.
In Table 3, we report estimates of the effect of tenure on the number of bidders, and
the winning rebate. Estimates confirm the presence of a negative relationship between
mayors’ tenure and the level of competition in the procurement auctions. A one standard
deviation increase in the years in office (3.76 years) is associated with a decrease in the
number of bidders by about 7.34% (with respect to a sample mean of 21.18 bidders),
and a decrease in the winning rebate by 3.2% (with respect to a sample mean of 12.91%).
Estimates are qualitatively invariant to the inclusion of a full set of controls, except for the
coefficient on the winning rebate being relatively smaller. Similarly, one additional term
in office is associated with a decrease in the number of bidders and in the winning rebate
by about 9% and 4%, respectively. The invariance of the estimates to the measurement
16That is, between March 27, 1988 and March 27, 1997, as the duration of a legislature before and after
the reform was 4 and 5 years, respectively.
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unit (years or terms) is also reassuring that the different duration of the terms elected
before and after September 2000 (4 and 5 years, respectively) does not affect our results.17
In Table 4, we report estimates when the dependent variable is an indicator of whether
the winning firm is registered in the same region, and the highest percentage of auctions
awarded to the same firm within the term. In both of these regressions, the effect of time in
office is both statistically and economically significant. A one standard deviation increase
in time in office is associated with an increase in the probability that the winner is a local
firm by about 3.1% (with respect to a sample mean of 70.58%), and with an increase in
the maximum percentage of auctions assigned to the same firm by 15% (with respect to
a sample mean of 22.86%).18 Similarly, one additional term in office is associated with an
increase in the probability that the winner is local and with an increase in the maximum
percentage of auctions assigned to the same firm by about 4.7% and 22.6%, respectively.
It is worth noting that in Table 3 the coefficient on the term limit is positive and
statistically significant on the number of bidders (+10%), i.e., there is higher participation
when a mayor is about to leave office, although the term limit has no effect on the final
adjudication price. In Table 4, the same coefficient is negative and statistically significant
on both outcomes, which shows that local contractors win less frequently when the term
limit is binding. Overall, our empirical evidence seems to suggest that mayors facing a
term limit have, to a certain degree, better procurement outcomes, which seems at odds
with other empirical evidence (Besley and Case, 1995; Ferraz and Finan, 2011; Alt et al.,
2011).19 One possible explanation is that in our data 46% of mayors facing a term limit
are then elected again in the same administration (e.g., as city councilor) and 6% in a
higher administration (e.g., in a province/region/national administration), these figures
being even larger if we could observe those who were not successful in running for office
again. These mayors may still have a career concern, and are therefore willing to run
better procurement in order to be granted another term. This is especially true in large
17 We also tried excluding auctions run with a restricted participation procedure (Trattativa Privata),
and could not find any difference in the results. We also tried including a quadratic term for the time in
office to capture any eventual non-linearity, but this was never statistically significant.
18We ran similar estimates on the probability that the winning firm is registered in the same
province/city. Results are quantitatively and qualitatively the same, but less statistically significant.
19 This is compatible with the findings of other studies using similar data for Italy, which confirm the
absence of a term limit effect over different outcomes (Grembi et al., 2015; Gagliarducci and Nannicini,
2013).
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cities, where the chance of moving to a higher offices is significantly larger (14%), possibly
because of higher visibility and media exposure. Accordingly, in Table A.1 we also show
that mayors facing a term limit have better procurement outcomes in large cities, while
the opposite holds true in small cities.
5.2 RD Estimates
In this section, we present the results of the RD analysis as outlined in equation 2. Since
the RD design induces variation in tenure by terms, not years, and given the similarity
of the OLS estimates with the two measures, from now on we will only focus on tenure
as measured by terms. We consider a sub-sample of 12,687 auctions managed by 2,268
mayors elected in non-open elections (i.e., the incumbent mayor is running for reelection)
with at least one rival. This sample is made of 531 first term mayors, 1,553 second term
mayors (22 could still be reelected), 182 third term mayors (2 could still be reelected), and
2 fourth term mayors who should not be reelected, and is similar to the original sample
of all auctions in terms of city, mayor and auction characteristics.20
Figure 1 reports the running-mean smoothing estimates of the four auction outcomes.
For values of MVim smaller than zero, the elected mayor is at the first term, while for
values above zero the elected mayor is at the second term or more. MVim is measured
as the difference between the percentage votes of the two best candidates in the decisive
electoral round. The jump in the outcomes is visible for the number of bidders and for
the highest percentage of auctions awarded to the same firm within the term. However,
we do not find a visible jump in the winning rebate, and in the indicator of whether the
winning firm is registered in the same region.
Table 5 reports the effects of tenure on the number of bidders and the winning rebate.
In columns 2 and 4, where we also control for a full set of observable characteristics,
we find that the effect of tenure on the number of bidders and the winning rebate are
-11.48% and -5.7%, respectively. Results are not qualitatively different when controls are
excluded (columns 1 and 3), which is first evidence of the validity of our RD strategy. A
back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the average public work costs, other things
20 RD estimates over the sample collapsed at city/term level are almost identical in terms of magnitude
and statistical significance. Also, OLS estimates over the RD sample are qualitatively similar to those in
Section 5.1. All these estimates available upon request.
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being equal, about 3,426 euros more in municipalities with a tenured mayor relative to
municipalities with a first term mayor.
In Table 6 we report the effects of tenure on the other two auction outcomes (the
nature of competition). The RD estimates of the effect of tenure on whether the winning
firm is registered in the same region or the highest percentage of auctions awarded to
the same firm within the term are positive and statistically significant (5%, and 25.6%,
respectively).21 Although we do not have direct evidence of any misbehavior on the part of
mayors, we find the last two estimates quite informative about the possible mechanism that
is driving the deterioration of the procurement process described in Table 5. In particular,
the result on the geographical origin of the winning firm seems fairly compatible with the
possibility that, when a mayor stays in power for longer, there is a higher probability that
he might distribute favors to local bidders. This is either because geographical proximity
enhances personal relationships, or because local bidders represent an easier target for
electoral exchange.
A major concern with the implementation of the RD design is that we may not be
able to control for all the relevant unobserved determinants of tenure in office and of the
procurement outcomes. For example, incumbent candidates may still be able to sort just
above the winning threshold because of larger campaign resources (Caughey and Sekhon,
2011), or because of more electoral strength.22 Alternatively, incumbent mayors might be
more likely to engage in fraudulent electoral activity when confronted with a tight race, in
which case they would be systematically different from first term mayors. To address this
issue, we first check whether the density of the running variable (MV) is continuous around
21In Table A.2 we try different alternative specifications of the RD model: 1) controlling for term
limit and pre-treatment variables only; 2) interacting the 3th order polynomial in the margin of victory
with the tenure indicator 3) using a fourth-order polynomial in the margin of victory; 4); using a third-
order polynomial in the margin of victory within the optimal bandwidth (estimated with the Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2013) procedure); finally, using a local linear regression with optimal bandwidth. In Table
A.3 we also run placebo tests at two simulated thresholds for the model discussed in section 4. The first
one considers elections with MVim > 0 and threshold at the median of this subsample, while the second
one considers elections with MVim < 0 and threshold at the median of this subsample. The evidence is
that estimates are fairly robust to different models specification and sample selection, and that at the two
simulated thresholds there are no effects of tenure on auctions’ outcomes, except on the highest percentage
of auctions awarded to the same firm within the term.
22Eggers et al. (2015) show that this problem is more severe in the U.S. House elections, where electoral
competition is extremely high, but it is almost irrelevant in other countries like the UK, France and
Germany.
16
the threshold (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). Estimates presented in Figure 2 suggest that
the density of MV is smooth and well behaved around the threshold (up to some small
sample noise). A formal density test (McCrary, 2008) rejects the presence of a statistically
significant jump (the estimated log-difference is -0.18, with a standard error of 0.13).
We further test the validity of the RD estimates by analyzing the behavior of the
available pre-treatment covariates in the neighborhood of the threshold. In Table A.4, we
estimate a simplified version of equation (2) without mayor and city covariates, considering
the pre-treatment covariates as dependent variables. When we compare first term mayors
to tenured mayors, we find that most of the municipality characteristics are well balanced,
although the probability of an incumbent to win seems higher in the North-West and
lower in the Center of Italy. Figure A.5 shows that as the electoral race becomes tight, the
observable characteristics of municipalities tend to equalize, which is not always the case for
less contested races. This is compelling evidence in support of the randomization induced
by tight electoral competitions. We also do not find significant differences between tenured
and untenured mayors, except for the former being on average older (see also Figure
A.6).23 In particular, all the politically relevant variables (previous political experience
within the same administration, whether the previous mayor was from the same party)
are well balanced, which is additional evidence against the possibility that more powerful
incumbents might be able to sort just above the threshold.24
It is worth noting that most of the RD estimates are larger in magnitude than the OLS
estimates. As discussed before, this is because the OLS estimates also include the positive
effect of electoral selection (mayors who are better at running procurement are also more
likely to gain reelection), whereas the RD estimates identify the causal effect of tenure net
of any selection bias. Now, we just proved that mayors who barely won reelection are ex-
ante identical in terms of observable characteristics to mayors who barely won a first term,
23One possible interpretation for this difference is that voters trade-off more experienced candidates
with new and younger candidates. Similar figures could be obtained comparing the subsample of mayors
without term limit, and the subsample of mayors with term limit, although in the latter group also city
extension and college education were not balanced.
24We also regressed first term procurement outcomes over the margin of victory in the next election
(only if the incumbent mayor is running for reelection), to check whether incumbents’ behavior may have
an impact on the probability of having a close race in the following election. We could not detect any
specific pattern around close races, if not the opposite: the number of bidders and the final rebate are
unaffected, while the probability that the winner is local, and the highest percentage of auctions awarded
to the same bidder grow with the margin of victory.
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i.e., there is no omitted variable bias in close electoral races. However, the comparison
between the OLS and the RD estimates corroborates (admittedly imperfectly) the idea
that Italian voters do understand that electing an incumbent for another term might
be associated with worse public procurement. So why should voters still be indifferent
between an incumbent and a challenger in close electoral races, despite knowing that the
former is likely to run a worse procurement? We could think of at least three possible
explanations.
First, one could simply assume that voters are not rational, i.e., they disregard the
information on the incumbents’ performance over procurement being negative. This ex-
planation seems to be at odds with the above comparison between the OLS and the RD
estimates.
Second, it could be that the outcomes that we measure are not a sufficient statistic of
the overall performance of a mayor in some important way. Therefore, there must be some
other outcome that compensates for the negative effect of tenure over procurement in close
electoral races. For example, it could be that more experienced mayors are more effective
at obtaining transfers from the central government, or at dealing with the municipal
bureaucracy.25 While this argument does not contradict our results on the effect of tenure
over procurement, it could certainly help explain why voters may still want to grant
reelection to an incumbent mayor who is likely to run a worse procurement.
Finally, the fact that voters reelect mayors who are worse at running procurement rela-
tive to challengers can also be explained within a simple model of electoral accountability
with risk-averse voters and incumbency advantage. Let’s assume that voters know the
level of inefficiency in procurement (x) for incumbent mayors (I), whereas they do not
know the challengers’ level of inefficiency (C), which is randomly drawn from some dis-
tribution.26 In close race elections, incumbent mayors have a level of inefficiency xm that
satisfies the voters’ indifference condition between electing I over C candidates, such that
25 For example, Padro´ i Miquel and Snyder (2006) show that productivity, measured by surveying
legislators, lobbyists, and journalists in North Carolina about the effectiveness of legislators in the House
of Representatives, rises sharply with tenure. More recently, Dal Bo´ and Rossi (2011) exploit a natural
experiment in the Argentine House of Representatives, where term lengths (two or four years) were ran-
domly assigned across members of parliament, to show that longer terms enhance legislative productivity,
as measured by attendance, committee activity, and the number of legislative achievements.
26 See Bernhardt and Ingerman (1985) for a more general model of electoral accountability with risk-
averse voters, and Berinsky and Lewis (2007) for a quantification of risk aversion among the U.S. electorate.
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UI(xm) = E(UC(x)), where UI(xm) is the utility from appointing an incumbent mayor
I and E(UC(x)) is the expected utility from appointing a challenger C. With concave
utility (risk-averse voters), we have that xm > E(x), where E(x) is the average level of
inefficiency among challengers. This inequality implies that incumbent mayors in close
race elections have a higher level of inefficiency than average challengers, i.e., voters are
indifferent between incumbents and challengers despite the former display a higher level of
inefficiency. Note that a similar argument can be used to compare the level of inefficiency
of challengers and incumbent mayors in an average election, which applies to the OLS
case. In these elections voters elect an incumbent mayor only if the level of inefficiency is
lower than the expected level of inefficiency among challengers, such that E(x|x ≤ E(x)).
Since xm > E(x), it turns out that the expected level of inefficiency of an incumbent in
average elections is smaller than xm, the level of inefficiency of incumbent mayors in close
race elections. This explains why the level of inefficiency of incumbent mayors in the OLS
estimates is lower than that of incumbent mayors in the RD estimates.
5.3 2SLS Estimates
In this section, we present the results of the 2SLS estimation as outlined in equation
3. Before that, we discuss the quality of the instrument. We first report evidence that
the election timing was independent from the reform by inspecting the distribution of
elections around March 1993. Between 1985 and 2008, elections were held fairly regularly,
up to a certain degree of asynchronism, although early terminations were more frequent
before March 1993 because the winning coalition did not receive a majority premium
at that time.27 When we focus on the four years around the March 1993 reform (see
Figure 3), we find that there were some elections that anticipated the reform (148 over
2,435) and very few that were delayed after the reform (46 out of 304), but the majority
of anticipated elections did not allow the incumbent mayor to gain one potential extra
term, with only 29 being reelected. We could not detect any significant difference in the
observable characteristics of mayors who anticipated the election and mayors who did not,
except for the former being on average slightly older. The final sample is made of 108 first
27An early termination is any anticipated conclusion of the term for one of the following reasons: a)
the resignation of the mayor; or b) the resignation of the majority of the council or a no-confidence vote
in the council. The variable is, therefore, missing after 2002. See Figure A.4.
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term mayors, 1,419 second term mayors (108 could still be reelected), and 252 third term
mayors (37 could still be reelected), and is similar to the original sample of all auctions in
terms of city, mayor and auction characteristics.28
In Tables 7 and 8 we report the 2SLS estimates on the number of bidders, the winning
rebate, the probability that the winning firm is local, and the maximum percentage of
auctions assigned to the same firm within the term. The functions f(.) and g(.) are
specified as a set of year dummies, while we exclude the two years before and after the
March 1993 reform. The first two columns in Table 7 report the first-stage estimates of the
effect of the reform on the terms in office, with and without controls. Mayors elected for
the first time before the reform accumulate an average of 0.970 terms more than mayors
elected after the reform.29 Moreover, the first-stage F-statistic of the excluded instrument
suggests that the instrument is relevant. When looking at the estimates with controls, we
find that one additional term in office causes a 16.7% decrease in the number of bidders
(with respect to a sample mean of 19.36), and a 9.9% reduction in the winning rebate
(with respect to a sample mean of 11.57%). Estimates without controls are somehow
larger in magnitude, although the sign and statistical significance is the same as with
controls. Finally, in Table 8, we report evidence of the relationship between the time in
office and the probability that the winning firm is local, and for the maximum percentage
of auctions assigned to the same firm within the term. Estimated coefficients in columns
2 and 4 are positive for both outcomes, but not statistically different from zero for the
probability that the winning firm is local. In particular, a one term increase in the time
in office implies a 36.7% increase in the maximum percentage of auctions assigned to the
same firm within the term (with respect to a sample mean of 25.05%).
As discussed in Section 4.2, we have to test the assumption that mayors elected right
before and after the reform were actually similar. To this purpose, in Table A.5 we estimate
a simplified version of the first-stage equation (4) without city and mayor covariates, and
using the mayor characteristics as dependent variable.30 Numbers show that most of the
28 2SLS estimates over the sample collapsed at city/term level are almost identical in terms of magnitude
and statistical significance. Also, OLS estimates over the 2SLS sample are qualitatively similar to those
in Section 5.1. All these estimates available upon request.
29This is additional evidence against the presence of a severe sample selection bias, otherwise the
coefficient should have been significantly lower than 1.
30City characteristics, like the resident population or the geographical location, would not be balanced
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differences at the discontinuity point are not statistically different from zero, although
mayors elected right after the reform (324 out of a total of 1,470 elected after the reform)
were slightly younger and more educated than those elected right before the reform (228
out of a total of 251 elected before the reform). However, most of the other characteristics
are well balanced, and in particular the percentage of mayors who had any appointment
in the same municipality before, which is evidence that parties had some initial difficulties
in recruiting new candidates more suited to the individual-ballot electoral system (see also
Figure A.7).31
There are at least three major concerns related to this identification strategy. First,
there might be a problem of sample selection, as we only observe the mayors who were
elected around 1993 and then survived until 2000-2005. In our data, we find that both
treated and control mayors have about 80% probability of being elected for a second term,
and that all the second term mayors without a term limit were then reelected for a third
term. This evidence allows us to rule out that the probability of being in the 2000-2005
sample might depend on the date of first election.
Second, at the time of the first election, mayors appointed before the 1993 reform had
potentially an infinite political horizon, while those elected after the reform could stay in
office for at most two more terms. Two implications can derive from this observation: 1)
since all the mayors were aware of the term limit, this knowledge had no impact on their ex-
post incentives; 2) since mayors had different career prospectives at the first election, this
may have affected their ex-ante decision to run for a mayoral office. Many political careers,
however, do not terminate after the mayoral office, as we report at the end of Section 5.1.
In particular, we do not find any statistical difference between mayors elected before and
after the reform on this probability, which corroborates the assumption that they actually
had similar political horizons. We will also return to this point when comparing mayor
characteristics around the reform in Section 5.3.
Finally, for the 2SLS identification strategy to hold, it also matters that mayors did
not anticipate the introduction of the term limit. Since the bill of the reform was first
if the election timing was to a certain degree coordinated, as it actually was, across regions. Accordingly,
we include these two variables in every specification along with the other controls.
31Similar figures could be obtained when comparing the subsample of mayors without term limit, and
the subsample of mayors with term limit.
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submitted to the national parliament on July 4, 1992, and finally approved on March 27,
1993, we can confidently assume that the reform was indeed unexpected. To rule out the
possibility that some mayors systematically resigned before the natural termination of the
term to take advantage of a potential extra term, we will further inspect the frequency
distribution of the election timing around March 1993 and look for any suspicious density
jump before March 27, 1993.
To sum up, the 2SLS estimates are similar in size and statistical significance to the
RD estimates of the causal effects of tenure in office. This allows us to provide external
validity to the RD findings, as we have estimated the same effects over two differently
selected samples, and with two different sets of identification assumptions.
6 Interpretation and Alternative Explanations
The analysis up to this point has shown fairly robust evidence that tenure in office affects
the functioning of public procurement: it reduces the number of bidders participating in
the auctions and the winning rebate, and it increases the probability that the contract
is awarded to a local firm, or to the same firm repeatedly. This evidence suggests that
tenured mayors do pay more for public goods, which is the cost of dealing with local
contractors that win repeated auctions. In what follows we consider a number of possible
explanations for these results.
6.1 Tenure in Office and Collusion
Our most preferred interpretation of the results is that tenure in office increases the like-
lihood of collusion between mayors and local contractors, as it takes time for contractors
to establish a preferential relationship with the mayor. With this respect, our evidence
seems at odds with the possibility that connections could be set up instantaneously at the
beginning of each electoral term, or that candidates already had established acquaintances
upon election, in which case the level of collusion should remain stable throughout the
elective office.
This interpretation builds on two key characteristics of public procurement auctions.
First, politicians can help preferred bidders in exchange for a bribe, and bidders may ben-
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efit from such an exchange. Second, politicians and contractors have repeated interactions
over time. Such characteristics have been highlighted in the literature on favoritism in
procurement auctions (Arozamena and Weinschelbaum, 2009; Burguet and Perry, 2009)
and on repeated auctions (Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn, 2004).
In Appendix B we lay out a simplified model of collusion where time in office helps
politicians and contractors build collusive relationships. The model assumes that types
(collusive or not) are predetermined and ex-ante unknown, and at each point in time (term)
a collusive mayor is randomly matched with a bidder. If the bidder is also collusive, then
the mayor, in exchange for a bribe, will allow the bidder to adjust the rebate and win. If the
bidder is not collusive, then the auction will be held regularly. Under these assumptions,
the probability of a collusive match increases with mayor’s tenure in office.
The model has the following four predictions, which resemble our main empirical re-
sults. First, as the mayor’s tenure in office increases, the probability that auctions are
assigned to the same bidder increases. Second, as the mayor’s tenure in office increases,
the revenues from the auction decrease. Third, in presence of entry costs, as the mayor’s
tenure in office increases, the number of bidders per auction decreases. Fourth, if local
bidders have lower costs of bribing (i.e., they find it easier to pay the bribe to the mayor)
and types (local or not) are not perfectly observed before the first interaction, as the
mayor’s tenure in office increases, the probability that the winner is local increases.
6.1.1 Tenure in Office and the Design of the Auction
In this section, we discuss in more detail some features of the auction design that may
highlight the mechanisms through which a mayor could interfere with the procurement
process.
First, it could be that more tenured mayors adjust the size or the type of works to
accomodate some specific bidders. We test this possibility by looking at four different
characteristics of the works. In columns 1-3 of Table 9 we consider the size of the works
in terms of reserve price. In columns 4-6 we consider whether there is a change in the
type of works, and specifically whether there is an increase in the works for construction
or maintenance of municipal roads (the largest share of public works).32 In columns 7-9
32 In Table A.6 we also test the presence of any effect over other categories of work, and found no
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we consider whether mayors run more complex works, where complexity is measures with
an indicator for whether works have a reserve price below 300,000 euros, which is the
threshold under which procurement is run with a simplified set of rules (see Coviello et al.
2016). Finally, in columns 10-12 we consider whether more tenured mayors run auctions
with a reserve price below 500,000 euros, which is the threshold under which auctions
are subject to less publicity requirements (see Coviello and Mariniello, 2014). Overall,
we could not detect any manipulation in the size and the type of the works either in the
OLS, RD and 2SLS estimates. This excludes the possibility that mayors could affect the
decision to execute a specific public work, which is under the control of the municipal
council, or could affect the size of the work, which is the result of a technical assessment
(see Section 2). At the same time, this result is reinsuring that our estimates of the effect
of tenure are not biased by any other change in the size and the type of works.33
Finally, we inspect whether tenure in office affects the identity of the auction manager.
In testing this hypothesis, we follow a similar argument to Iyer and Mani (2012), who show
that a change in the identity of Indian state politicians results in a significant increase in
the probability of bureaucrat reassignments. In the Italian set-up, the turnover of local
bureaucrats across different posts within the same municipality can be interpreted as a
form of control from the mayors over the administration. This is especially the case if
mayors want to have the power to assign bureaucrats to specific tasks, for example in
order to favor local contractors. Bureaucrats, in turn, might care about the prestige and
importance of the posts they are assigned to, or they can also benefit from getting close
repeated interactions with local contractors (for example, to share part of the bribes).
We test this hypothesis in the subsample of municipalities for which we have data on the
identity of the managers (10,795 auctions for 1,789 mayors in the RD sample). Looking at
Table 10, we find that the highest percentage of auctions managed by the same manager
increases by about 19-21% (compared to an average of 60%) at each additional term in
office, which highlights a possible channel through which mayors can exert direct control
significant evidence.
33 At aggregate level, we also find that the number of auctions per term slightly declines with tenure
(see Table A.7), possibly because mayors anticipate some works to the initial terms, given uncertainty
about future reelection. This is reinsuring about our estimates not being driven by the possibility that
the number of bidders declines with tenure as there are also more auctions taking place, in which case
firms would eventually face a capacity constraint.
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over the procurement process.
6.2 Tenure in Office and Learning
One possible alternative explanation for our results is that, as tenure increases, mayors
acquire more skills in designing and mastering the procurement mechanism. If this was
the case, more tenured mayors should be more likely to deliver better public works (see
Padro´ i Miquel and Snyder, 2006, and Dal Bo´ and Rossi, 2011).
This hypothesis would be compatible with our evidence if, for example, we were still
missing some important dimensions of the procurement process, like the ex-post renegoti-
ations and the unobserved quality of the works. It could be that more experienced mayors
are willing to favor more expensive bidders because in the past they had delivered public
works with better quality and with less delays, whereas unexperienced mayors do not.
Therefore, although it is true that tenured mayors are paying a higher price, they also do
better in favoring contractors that systematically deliver better works. On the other hand,
the OECD (2005) and Ferraz and Finan (2010) associate the over-use of ex-post renego-
tiations to corruption practices. This is the case, for example, if public officials protect
contractors that use low quality construction materials, or tolerate excessive delays in the
delivery of the works without reporting contractors to public officials.34 We can test this
hypothesis by studying the effect of tenure in office on two additional sources of data.
First, we analyze the delays in the delivery of the public works, which represent a
measure of ex-post renegotiation of the original deadline of the contract. In the subsample
of municipalities for which we have the data (5,218 auctions for 1,160 mayors in the RD
sample), almost 90% of the works were not delivered on time, with an average of 178 days
of delay. In Table 11, we report the OLS, RD, and 2SLS estimates of our equations of
interest. Our evidence suggests that tenure in office actually raises the number of days
of delay in the delivery of the public work by about 1 month (13-22%) per term. This
evidence, together with the evidence on the reduction in the winning rebate, suggests that
the extra cost of procurement is not offset by faster delivery.
Second, we look at the price of repeated purchases of goods and services by the Italian
34Olken (2007) shows that there are large discrepancies between the official cost and an independent
engineers’ estimate of the cost of road projects in Indonesia, and that these discrepancies are sensitive to
anti-corruption audits.
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municipalities. As discussed in Bandiera et al. (2009), goods and services are more
standardized in their quality compared to public works. For instance, the purchase of
paper for a photocopy machine should be a standard activity, and the price should not be
affected by the tenure of the mayor. To test this hypothesis, we repeat our analysis on a
sample of all the municipal procurement auctions for the purchase of goods and services
that we could recover for the period 2000-2010.35 As in Bandiera et al. (2009), we control
for unobservable quality characteristics by including 93 fixed effects for the typology of
the good or service, that we can estimate because goods and services are the same across
different years and administrations. These fixed effects should purge our estimates from
any compositional effect. Looking at Table 12, in all specifications but one (2SLS), we find
that conditional on quality, the price of an average good increases by about 9-16% at each
additional term in office (compared to an average winning rebate of 17%). This evidence
suggests that screening for quality cannot be the only reason why we observe procurement
prices of goods and service increasing with the mayor’s tenure. These results are also in
line with the description of municipal corruption in Ferraz and Finan (2010), which show
that corruption in Brazilian municipalities is often associated with over-invoicing of goods
and services.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we used a matched mayor-auction data set to provide novel empirical evi-
dence on the extent to which politicians can influence public procurement. Our main result
is that, when politicians stay in power for a longer period of time, there is a systematic
deterioration in the functioning of the auction mechanism: we observe less participation, a
higher cost of public works, and an increase in the probability that the winner is an insider
and that the same firm wins more often. These effects persist even after controlling for
the endogeneity of time in office using close race elections and an instrumental variable
approach.
With the aid of more data on the ex-post executions of the works, and the purchases of
35Data provided by Telemat S.p.A., an information-provider leader in the Italian market for reselling
information on public contracts.
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standardized goods and services, we interpret these findings as evidence that when a mayor
stays in power for a longer period there is a higher probability of collusion. Alternative
explanations, like mayors learning the quality of the bidders, are not supported by the
data.
From the point of view of a regulator interested in rationalizing public spending, our
empirical findings encourage the implementation of policies favoring political turnover
(for example, through a term limit), such that competition in public procurement can be
restored. Our findings also suggest that the local economy might benefit from the intro-
duction of policies aimed at limiting the power that politicians can exercise through public
procurement (for example, through the institution of a central purchasing authority), but
only when the functioning of procurement auctions is sensitive to the repeated interaction
between politicians and local bidders.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: City, mayor, and term characteristics
Mean St.Dev. Min p25 p50 p75 Max
City characteristics. N. cities: 3,947
Outcome:
North-West 0.41 0.49 0 0 0 1 1
North-East 0.20 0.40 0 0 0 0 1
Center 0.14 0.35 0 0 0 0 1
South 0.21 0.41 0 0 0 0 1
Islands 0.04 0.19 0 0 0 0 1
Population 9,977 56,914 49 1,490 3,445 7,855 2,733,908
Budget deficit 0.02 0.05 -0.45 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.64
Efficiency of the judiciary 100.65 62.4 30.20 55.30 94.10 126.60 462.50
Mayor/term characteristics. N. terms: 5,481
Female 0.08 0.28 0 0 0 0 1
Age 49.84 9.21 25.30 43.35 49.61 55.74 85.61
Born in the city 0.52 0.50 0 0 1 1 1
Born in the province 0.85 0.36 0 1 1 1 1
Born in the region 0.94 0.24 0 1 1 1
Education:
Secondary 0.53 0.50 0 0 1 1 1
College 0.45 0.50 0 0 0 1 1
Employment:
Not employed 0.11 0.32 0 0 0 0 1
Low-skilled 0.04 0.19 0 0 0 0 1
Medium-skilled 0.09 0.29 0 0 0 0 1
High-skilled 0.76 0.43 0 1 1 1 1
Political characteristics:
Any previous experience 0.62 0.49 0 0 1 1 1
Years in office 4.74 3.76 0.00 1.84 3.92 6.81 20.22
Term in office = 1 0.57 0.49 0 0 1 1 1
Term in office = 2 0.35 0.48 0 0 1 1 1
Term in office = 3 0.05 0.21 0 0 0 1 1
Term in office = 4 0.03 0.17 0 0 0 1 1
Term limit binding 0.39 0.49 0 0 0 1 1
Center-right 0.10 0.30 0 0 0 0 1
Center 0.06 0.23 0 0 0 0 1
Center-left 0.28 0.45 0 0 0 1 1
N. terms in office (party) 0.42 0.61 0 0 0 1 4
Notes. Cities with at least one auction between 2000-2005. Population is the number of resident inhabitants
at the beginning of the first observed term. Budget deficit is the municipal budget deficit over total revenues.
Efficiency of the judiciary is the ratio between settled and incoming cases for each regional administrative
court (TAR), and for public works related disputes. Low-skilled includes blue-collars, Medium-skilled clerks,
and High-skilled entrepreneurs and self-employed. Any previous experience is a dummy for whether the mayor
was in the council or in the executive committee before. Years/terms in office without interruption. Term
limit binding is a dummy for whether or not the mayor can be reelected. N. terms in office (party) is the
tenure of the mayor’s party in terms.
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Table 2: Auction characteristics
Mean St.Dev. Min p25 p50 p75 Max
Outcome:
Number of bidders 21.18 21.08 1 5 14 31 100
Winning rebate (%) 12.91 8.39 0 6.78 12.36 17.05 49.99
Winner in the city (%) 12.31 32.86 0 0 0 0 100
Winner in the region (%) 70.58 45.57 0 0 100 100 100
Max wins same firm (%) 25.05 25.81 2.21 8.00 16.67 33.33 100
Selection mechanism:
Restricted auction 0.10 0.29 0 0 0 0 1
Characteristics of the good:
Reserve price 5.39 9.31 1.34 2.03 2.94 5.15 190.83
Road 0.23 0.42 0 0 0 0 1
School 0.13 0.33 0 0 0 0 1
Building 0.05 0.22 0 0 0 0 1
Housing 0.01 0.11 0 0 0 0 1
Art 0.04 0.19 0 0 0 0 1
Others 0.54 0.50 0 0 1 1 1
Year bid delivery:
2000 0.16 0.36 0 0 0 0 1
2001 0.20 0.40 0 0 0 0 1
2002 0.21 0.40 0 0 0 0 1
2003 0.20 0.40 0 0 0 0 1
2004 0.15 0.36 0 0 0 0 1
2005 0.09 0.29 0 0 0 0 1
N. auctions: 28,058
Notes. Auctions for works with reserve price greater than or equal to 150,000 euros, and no more than
100 bidders. Winner in the city/region is a dummy for whether or not the winning firm is registered
in the same city/region of the contracting authority. Max wins same firm is the highest percentage of
auctions assigned to the same firm within the term. Restricted auction is a dummy for the selection
mechanism being a Trattativa privata. Reserve price is the reserve price set by the contracting authority,
in 100,000 euros (2000 equivalents).
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Table 3: Tenure in office and the level of competition, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: N. of N. of N. of Winning Winning Winning
bidders bidders bidders rebate rebate rebate
Mean outcome: 21.18 21.18 21.18 12.91% 12.91% 12.91%
N. years in office -0.403*** -0.414*** -0.307*** -0.107***
(0.097) (0.118) (0.064) (0.037)
N. terms in office -1.910*** -0.695***
(0.475) (0.203)
Term limit binding 2.022** 2.130*** 0.024 0.274
(0.855) (0.826) (0.290) (0.313)
Population 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.046*** 0.046***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.009) (0.009)
Reserve price 0.687*** 0.687*** 0.084*** 0.084***
(0.076) (0.076) (0.012) (0.012)
Female -0.489 -0.446 -0.151 -0.143
(0.709) (0.713) (0.237) (0.237)
Age 0.016 0.010 0.021** 0.020**
(0.024) (0.025) (0.009) (0.009)
N. terms in office (party) -0.673 -0.465 -0.365** -0.303*
(0.424) (0.443) (0.156) (0.162)
N. auctions 28,058 28,058 28,058 28,058 28,058 28,058
R-squared 0.004 0.234 0.233 0.014 0.483 0.483
Province fixed effects no yes yes no yes yes
Year dummies no yes yes no yes yes
City characteristics no yes yes no yes yes
Auction characteristics no yes yes no yes yes
Mayor characteristics no yes yes no yes yes
Electoral characteristics no yes yes no yes yes
Notes. Estimates on 5,481 terms. N. of bidders is the number of firms that submitted a bid. Winning Rebate is expressed
as a percentage discount from the the reserve price. Term limit binding is a dummy for whether or not the mayor cannot
be reelected. Population is the number of resident inhabitants at the beginning of the term, in 10,000. Reserve price is
the reserve price set by the contracting authority, in 100,000 euros (2000 equivalents). N. terms in office (party) is the
tenure of the mayor’s party in terms. When denoted with “yes”, regressions additionally include Province fixed effects (102
dummies); Year dummies (2000-2004) refer to the year of bid delivery; City characteristics (the budget balance deficit in
percentage of the revenues at year level, judiciary efficiency at year-regional level); Auction characteristics (squared term
of the reserve price, 5 object characteristics dummies, 1 selection mechanism dummy); Mayor characteristics (2 education
dummies, 3 previous occupation dummies, a dummy for being born in the region); Electoral characteristics (a dummy for
being in the last year before the next election, 2 political party dummies, a dummy for previous experience in council or
executive committee). All mayoral and electoral characteristics are at the beginning of the term. Standard errors are robust
to clustering at the mayor level in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and
at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 4: Tenure in office and the nature of competition, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Winner Winner Winner Max wins Max wins Max wins
local local local same firm same firm same firm
Mean outcome: 70.58% 70.58% 70.46% 22.86 % 22.86 % 22.86 %
N. years in office 0.536*** 0.588*** 0.898*** 0.916***
(0.141) (0.158) (0.185) (0.215)
N. terms in office 3.346*** 5.165***
(0.930) (1.311)
Term limit binding -2.993** -3.850*** -2.722** -3.960**
(1.211) (1.414) (1.351) (1.657)
Population 0.025 0.025 -0.128*** -0.133***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.033) (0.032)
Reserve price -0.986*** -0.986*** -0.156*** -0.156***
(0.072) (0.072) (0.030) (0.030)
Female -0.655 -0.705 -1.677 -1.687
(1.252) (1.253) (1.535) (1.518)
Age -0.008 -0.001 -0.185*** -0.175***
(0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051)
N. terms in office (party) 1.466* 1.146 2.486*** 2.183***
(0.749) (0.750) (0.844) (0.833)
N. auctions 28,058 28,058 28,058 23,523 23,523 23,523
R-squared 0.001 0.098 0.098 0.015 0.295 0.295
Province fixed effects no yes yes no yes yes
Year dummies no yes yes no yes yes
City characteristics no yes yes no yes yes
Auction characteristics no yes yes no yes yes
Mayor characteristics no yes yes no yes yes
Electoral characteristics no yes yes no yes yes
Notes. Estimates on 5,481 terms for Winner local, and on 3,995 terms for Max wins same firm (terms elected between
1998 and 2003). Winner local indicates whether or not the winning firm is registered in the same region. Max wins same
firm is the highest percentage of auctions assigned to the same firm within the term,. Term limit binding is a dummy for
whether or not the mayor can be reelected or not. Population is the number of resident inhabitants at the beginning of
the term, in 10,000. Reserve price is the reserve price set by the contracting authority, in 100,000 euros (2000 equivalents).
N. terms in office (party) is the tenure of the mayor’s party in terms. When denoted with “yes”, regressions additionally
include Province fixed effects (102 dummies); Year dummies (2000-2004) refer to the year of bid delivery; City characteristics
(the budget balance deficit in percentage of the revenues at year level, judiciary efficiency at year-regional level); Auction
characteristics (squared term of the reserve price, 5 object characteristics dummies, 1 selection mechanism dummy); Mayor
characteristics (2 education dummies, 3 previous occupation dummies, a dummy for being born in the region); Electoral
characteristics (a dummy for being in the last year before the next election, 2 political party dummies, a dummy for previous
experience in council or executive committee). All mayoral and electoral characteristics are at the beginning of the term.
Standard errors are robust to clustering at the mayor level in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *,
at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 5: Tenure in office and the level of competition, RD
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: N. of N. of Winning Winning
bidders bidders rebate rebate
Mean outcome: 21.52 21.52 12.26% 12.26%
N. terms in office -1.866 -2.469*** -1.581** -0.705**
(1.859) (0.930) (0.664) (0.308)
Term limit binding 3.740** 1.301 1.181**
(1.715) (1.157) (0.499)
Population 0.090*** 0.031***
(0.025) (0.004)
Starting value 0.746*** 0.104***
(0.093) (0.017)
Female 0.006 0.146
(0.845) (0.309)
Age 0.035 0.025**
(0.030) (0.010)
N. terms in office (party) -0.885 -0.103
(0.583) (0.192)
N. auctions 12,687 12,687 12,687 12,687
R-squared 0.004 0.255 0.005 0.464
Margin of victory yes yes yes yes
Province fixed effects no yes no yes
City characteristics no yes no yes
Year dummies no yes no yes
Auction characteristics no yes no yes
Mayor characteristics no yes no yes
Electoral characteristics no yes no yes
Notes. Estimates on 2,268 terms. N. of bidders is the number of firms that submitted
a bid. Winning Rebate is expressed as a percentage discount from the the reserve
price. Term limit binding is a dummy for whether the mayor can be reelected or
not. Population is the number of resident inhabitants at the beginning of the term, in
10,000. Reserve price is the reserve price set by the contracting authority, in 100,000
euros (2000 equivalents). N. terms in office (party) is the tenure of the mayor’s party
in terms. When denoted with “yes”, regressions additionally include Margin of victory
(3rd order polynomial in the margin of victory ); Province fixed effects (102 dummies);
Year dummies (2000-2004) refer to the year of bid delivery; City characteristics (the
budget balance deficit in percentage of the revenues at year level, judiciary efficiency
at year-regional level); Auction characteristics (squared term of the reserve price, 5
object characteristics dummies, 1 selection mechanism dummy); Mayor characteristics
(2 education dummies, 3 previous occupation dummies, a dummy for being born in
the region); Electoral characteristics (a dummy for being in the last year before the
next election, 2 political party dummies, a dummy for previous experience in council
or executive committee). All mayoral and electoral characteristics are at the beginning
of the term. Standard errors are robust to clustering at the mayor level in parentheses.
Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1%
level by ***.
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Table 6: Tenure in office and the nature of competition, RD
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Winner Winner Max wins Max wins
local local same firm same firm
Mean outcome: 70.20% 70.20% 22.37 % 22.37 %
N. terms in office 4.776** 3.458 6.023*** 5.729***
(1.926) (2.173) (1.861) (2.189)
Term limit binding -1.604 -2.491
(3.325) (2.837)
Population 0.003 -0.108**
(0.015) (0.044)
Starting value -0.992*** -0.157***
(0.105) (0.036)
Female 3.035* -4.637**
(1.730) (1.841)
Age -0.078 -0.222***
(0.075) (0.067)
N. terms in office (party) 0.552 1.367
(1.335) (1.146)
N. auctions 12,687 12,687 11,099 11,099
R-squared 0.002 0.100 0.032 0.309
Margin of victory yes yes yes yes
Province fixed effects no yes no yes
City characteristics no yes no yes
Year dummies no yes no yes
Auction characteristics no yes no yes
Mayor characteristics no yes no yes
Electoral characteristics no yes no yes
Notes. Estimates on 2,268 terms for Winner local, and on 1,825 terms for Max wins
same firm (terms elected between 1998 and 2003). Winner local indicates whether or
not the winning firm is registered in the same region. Max wins same firm is the highest
percentage of auctions assigned to the same firm within the term. Term limit binding
is a dummy for whether the mayor can be reelected or not. Population is the number
of resident inhabitants at the beginning of the term, in 10,000. Reserve price is the
reserve price set by the contracting authority, in 100,000 euros (2000 equivalents). N.
terms in office (party) is the tenure of the mayor’s party in terms. When denoted with
“yes”, regressions additionally include Margin of victory (3rd order polynomial in the
margin of victory ); Province fixed effects (102 dummies); Year dummies (2000-2004)
refer to the year of bid delivery; City characteristics (the budget balance deficit in per-
centage of the revenues at year level, judiciary efficiency at year-regional level); Auction
characteristics (squared term of the reserve price, 5 object characteristics dummies, 1
selection mechanism dummy); Mayor characteristics (2 education dummies, 3 previous
occupation dummies, a dummy for being born in the region); Electoral characteristics
(a dummy for being in the last year before the next election, 2 political party dummies,
a dummy for previous experience in council or executive committee). All mayoral and
electoral characteristics are at the beginning of the term. Standard errors are robust to
clustering at the mayor level in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented
by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 7: Tenure in office and the level of competition, 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: N. terms N. terms N. of N. of Winning Winning
in office in office bidders bidders rebate rebate
Mean outcome: 2.075 2.075 19.36 19.36 11.57% 11.57%
N. terms in office -10.227*** -3.231*** -4.717*** -1.143***
(2.726) (1.154) (1.009) (0.376)
Elected before March 1993 0.501*** 0.970***
(0.136) (0.079)
Term limit binding 0.821*** 0.846 0.591
(0.041) (1.956) (0.605)
Population -0.000 0.110*** 0.045***
(0.000) (0.037) (0.005)
Reserve price 0.000 0.780*** 0.119***
(0.000) (0.087) (0.022)
Female -0.009 1.035 0.154
(0.006) (1.034) (0.368)
Age -0.000 0.063* 0.026**
(0.001) (0.033) (0.011)
N. terms in office (party) 0.051** -1.057* 0.130
(0.021) (0.559) (0.179)
N. auctions 9,016 9,016 9,016 9,016 9,016 9,016
R-squared 0.756 0.892 0.022 0.264 0.034 0.472
F-exc.-Inst 3280.8 1006.5
Province fixed effects no yes no yes no yes
Year dummies no yes no yes no yes
City characteristics no yes no yes no yes
Auction characteristics no yes no yes no yes
Mayor characteristics no yes no yes no yes
Electoral characteristics no yes no yes no yes
Notes. Estimates on 1,783 terms. N. of bidders is the number of firms that submitted a bid. Winning Rebate is expressed as
a percentage discount from the the reserve price. Elected before March 1993 is a dummy for whether or not the mayor was
elected for the first time before March 27, 1993. Term limit binding is a dummy for whether the mayor can be reelected or
not. Population is the number of resident inhabitants at the beginning of the term, in 10,000. Reserve price is the reserve
price set by the contracting authority, in 100,000 euros (2000 equivalents). N. terms in office (party) is the tenure of the
mayor’s party in terms. When denoted with “yes”, regressions additionally include Province fixed effects (102 dummies);
Year dummies (2000-2004) refer to the year of bid delivery; City characteristics (the budget balance deficit in percentage
of the revenues at year level, judiciary efficiency at year-regional level); Auction characteristics (squared term of the reserve
price, 5 object characteristics dummies, 1 selection mechanism dummy); Mayor characteristics (2 education dummies, 3
previous occupation dummies, a dummy for being born in the region); Electoral characteristics (a dummy for being in
the last year before the next election, 2 political party dummies, a dummy for previous experience in council or executive
committee). All mayoral and electoral characteristics are at the beginning of the term. Standard errors are robust to
clustering at the mayor level in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at
the 1% level by ***.
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Table 8: Tenure in office and the nature of competition, 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Winner Winner Max wins Max wins
local local same firm same firm
Mean outcome: 71.05 % 71.05 % 25.05 % 25.05 %
N. terms in office 10.953*** 4.342 16.836*** 8.934***
(3.581) (2.721) (3.234) (2.789)
Term limit binding 4.370 0.498
(4.712) (8.380)
Population -0.002 -1.502***
(0.024) (0.152)
Starting value -0.937*** -0.061
(0.120) (0.043)
Female 3.077* 0.449
(1.846) (1.742)
Age 0.027 -0.094
(0.079) (0.069)
N. terms in office (party) 1.540 1.367
(1.300) (1.285)
N. auctions 9,016 9,016 7,834 7,834
R-squared 0.006 0.115 0.029 0.395
Province fixed effects no yes no yes
Year dummies no yes no yes
City characteristics no yes no yes
Auction characteristics no yes no yes
Mayor characteristics no yes no yes
Electoral characteristics no yes no yes
Notes. Estimates on 1,783 terms for Winner local, and on 1,443 terms for Max wins same firm (terms elected between
1998 and 2003). N. terms in office instrumented with Elected before March 1993 as in Table 7. Winner local is a dummy
for whether or not the winning firm is registered in the same region. Max wins same firm is the highest percentage of
public tenders assigned to the same firm within the term. Term limit binding is a dummy for whether the mayor can be
reelected or not. Population is the number of resident inhabitants at the beginning of the term, in 10,000. Reserve price
is the reserve price set by the contracting authority, in 100,000 euros (2000 equivalents). N. terms in office (party) is the
tenure of the mayor’s party in terms. When denoted with “yes”, regressions additionally include Province fixed effects (102
dummies); Year dummies (2000-2004) refer to the year of bid delivery; City characteristics (the budget balance deficit in
percentage of the revenues at year level, judiciary efficiency at year-regional level); Auction characteristics (squared term
of the reserve price, 5 object characteristics dummies, 1 selection mechanism dummy); Mayor characteristics (2 education
dummies, 3 previous occupation dummies, a dummy for being born in the region); Electoral characteristics (a dummy for
being in the last year before the next election, 2 political party dummies, a dummy for previous experience in council or
executive committee). All mayoral and electoral characteristics as at the beginning of the term. Standard errors robust to
clustering at the mayor level in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at
the 1% level by ***.
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Table 9: Tenure in office and the design of the auction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dependent variable: Reserve price Roads Less complex No publicity
Method: OLS RDD IV OLS RDD IV OLS RDD IV OLS RDD IV
Mean outcome: 5.387 5.395 5.113 0.229 0.235 0.240 0.511 0.510 0.519 0.740 0.741 0.755
N.terms in office -0.175 -0.190 -0.185 -0.003 0.030 0.013 0.005 0.003 0.022 0.016* 0.006 0.031
(0.131) (0.223) (0.329) (0.012) (0.023) (0.027) (0.013) (0.024) (0.029) (0.009) (0.019) (0.026)
Term limit binding -0.031 -0.829* -0.108 0.003 -0.062* -0.015 -0.002 -0.008 0.028 -0.009 0.036 0.011
(0.211) (0.460) (0.510) (0.016) (0.036) (0.039) (0.016) (0.034) (0.045) (0.013) (0.028) (0.041)
Population 0.040*** 0.038*** 0.024*** -0.001** -0.000 -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Reserve price -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female -0.151 0.086 0.675 -0.021** -0.033** -0.033* 0.017 0.013 -0.000 0.021* 0.014 -0.015
(0.223) (0.370) (0.470) (0.011) (0.016) (0.019) (0.016) (0.026) (0.030) (0.012) (0.019) (0.024)
Age 0.018** 0.025*** 0.020* 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001** -0.002*** -0.001
(0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
N. terms in office (party) -0.202* -0.107 0.154 -0.006 -0.014 -0.014 0.022*** 0.040*** 0.026* 0.021*** 0.025** 0.015
(0.108) (0.167) (0.205) (0.008) (0.012) (0.013) (0.008) (0.012) (0.014) (0.007) (0.011) (0.012)
N. auctions 28,058 12,688 9,016 28,058 12,688 9,016 28,058 12,688 9,016 28,058 12,688 9,016
R-squared 0.041 0.054 0.039 0.078 0.076 0.079 0.037 0.051 0.042 0.048 0.071 0.046
Margin of victory no yes no no yes no no yes no no yes no
Province fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
City characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Auction characteristics yes yes yes no no no no no no yes yes yes
Mayor characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Electoral characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes. Estimates on 5,481, 2,269, and 1,783 terms for the OLS, RD, and 2SLS estimates, respectively. In the 2SLS estimates N. terms in office is instrumented with Elected
before March 1993 as in Table 7. Reserve price is the reserve price set by the contracting authority, in 100,000 euros (2000 equivalents). Roads is a dummy for whether the work
is for construction or maintenance of municipal roads. Less Complex is a dummy for whether the reserve price is below the 300, 000 euros. No publicity is a dummy for whether
the reserve price is below the 500, 000 euros. Term limit binding is a dummy for whether the mayor can be reelected or not. Population is the number of resident inhabitants at
the beginning of the term, in 10,000. N. terms in office (party) is the tenure of the mayor’s party in terms. When denoted with “yes”, regressions additionally include Margin of
victory (3rd order polynomial in the margin of victory ); Province fixed effects (102 dummies); Year dummies (2000-2004) refer to the year of bid delivery; City characteristics
(the budget balance deficit in percentage of the revenues at year level, judiciary efficiency at year-regional level); Auction characteristics (5 object characteristics dummies, 1
selection mechanism dummy). In columns 4-9, we only include the selection mechanism dummy. Mayor characteristics (2 education dummies, 3 previous occupation dummies,
a dummy for being born in the region); Electoral characteristics (a dummy for being in the last year before the next election, 2 political party dummies, a dummy for previous
experience in council or executive committee). All mayoral and electoral characteristics are at the beginning of the term. Standard errors are robust to clustering at the mayor
level in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 10: Tenure in office and the auction manager
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: Auctions with the same manager
Method: OLS RD 2SLS
Mean outcome: 59.04% 60.97% 64.24%
N. terms in office 12.747*** 11.878*** 13.521***
(2.350) (2.387) (3.506)
Term limit binding -10.781*** -8.074** -13.375*
(3.143) (3.911) (7.112)
Population -0.436*** -0.504*** -2.705***
(0.068) (0.078) (0.234)
Reserve price -0.246*** -0.268*** -0.227***
(0.048) (0.058) (0.060)
Female -2.172 -8.029** -2.135
(2.653) (3.594) (3.348)
Age -0.435*** -0.519*** -0.256**
(0.091) (0.126) (0.124)
N. terms in office (party) 2.528* 0.506 0.409
(1.422) (1.772) (1.923)
N. auctions 20,551 10,795 6,893
R-squared 0.469 0.485 0.546
Margin of victory no yes no
Goods fixed effects yes yes yes
Province fixed effects yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes
City characteristics yes yes yes
Auction characteristics yes yes yes
Mayor characteristics yes yes yes
Electoral characteristics yes yes yes
Notes. Estimates on 3,397, 1,791, and 1,256 terms (terms elected between 1998 and 2003) for the OLS, RD, and 2SLS
estimates, respectively. In the 2SLS estimates N. terms in office is instrumented with Elected before March 1993 as in Table
7. % auctions with the same manager is the highest percentage of public tenders administrated by to the same manager
within the term, and it is term invariant. Winning Rebate is expressed as a percentage discount from the the reserve
price. Term limit binding is a dummy for whether the mayor can be reelected or not. Population is the number of resident
inhabitants at the beginning of the term, in 10,000. Reserve price is the reserve price set by the contracting authority, in
100,000 euros (2000 equivalents). N. terms in office (party) is the tenure of the mayor’s party in terms. When denoted
with “yes”, regressions additionally include Margin of victory (3rd order polynomial in the margin of victory ); Goods fixed
effects (91 good or service characteristics dummies); Province fixed effects (102 dummies); Year dummies (2000-2010 and an
indicator for purchases after the introduction of CONSIP) refer to the year of bid delivery; City characteristics (the budget
balance deficit in percentage of the revenues at year level, judiciary efficiency at year-regional level); Auction characteristics
(squared term of the reserve price,1 selection mechanism dummy); Mayor characteristics (2 education dummies, 3 previous
occupation dummies, a dummy for being born in the region); Electoral characteristics (a dummy for being in the last year
before the next election, 2 political party dummies, a dummy for previous experience in council or executive committee).
All mayoral and electoral characteristics are at the beginning of the term. Standard errors are robust to clustering at the
mayor level in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by
***.
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Table 11: Tenure in office and the delay in the delivery of the works
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: Days of delay
Method: OLS RD 2SLS
Mean outcome: 182 178.1 186.8
N. terms in office 23.953*** 30.888** 41.803**
(5.706) (15.106) (18.609)
Term limit binding -25.248*** -36.913* -23.552
(7.442) (19.853) (24.914)
Population -0.434*** -0.413*** -0.487***
(0.091) (0.102) (0.165)
Reserve price 9.874*** 9.962*** 10.670***
(0.669) (0.870) (0.901)
Female 4.374 -6.060 -13.606
(6.470) (8.737) (10.508)
Age -0.318 -0.356 -1.235***
(0.240) (0.383) (0.427)
N. terms in office (party) 7.102* 1.193 7.416
(4.292) (7.098) (9.175)
N. auctions 12,118 5,218 4,048
R-squared 0.155 0.148 0.182
Margin of victory no yes no
Province fixed effects yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes
City characteristics yes yes yes
Auction characteristics yes yes yes
Mayor characteristics yes yes yes
Electoral characteristics yes yes yes
Notes. Estimates on 2,889, 1,186, and 991 terms for the OLS, RD, and 2SLS estimates, respectively. In the 2SLS estimates
N. terms in office is instrumented with Elected before March 1993 as in Table 7. Days of delay represent the days of delay
in the delivery of the works. Term limit binding is a dummy for whether the mayor can be reelected or not. Population
is the number of resident inhabitants at the beginning of the term, in 10,000. Reserve price is the reserve price set by
the contracting authority, in 100,000 euros (2000 equivalents). N. terms in office (party) is the tenure of the mayor’s
party in terms. When denoted with “yes”, regressions additionally include Margin of victory (3rd order polynomial in the
margin of victory ); Province fixed effects (102 dummies); Year dummies (2000-2004) refer to the year of bid delivery; City
characteristics (the budget balance deficit in percentage of the revenues at year level, judiciary efficiency at year-regional
level); Auction characteristics (squared term of the reserve price, 5 object characteristics dummies, 1 selection mechanism
dummy); Mayor characteristics (2 education dummies, 3 previous occupation dummies, a dummy for being born in the
region); Electoral characteristics (a dummy for being in the last year before the next election, 2 political party dummies,
a dummy for previous experience in council or executive committee). All mayoral and electoral characteristics are at the
beginning of the term. Standard errors are robust to clustering at the mayor level in parentheses. Significance at the 10%
level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 12: Tenure in office and the purchase of goods and services
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: Winning rebate (%)
Method: OLS RD 2SLS
Mean outcome: 17.34 16.85 17.91
N. terms in office -1.529** -2.696** -2.189
(0.643) (1.076) (1.975)
Term limit binding 1.456* 1.106 -2.435
(0.835) (1.373) (2.605)
Population 0.037*** 0.039** 0.004
(0.012) (0.016) (0.025)
Reserve price -0.076* -0.078 -0.397***
(0.040) (0.088) (0.126)
Female -0.034 -0.594 1.437
(0.858) (0.994) (2.134)
Age 0.050** 0.148*** 0.086
(0.024) (0.034) (0.074)
N. terms in office (party) -0.083 0.159 1.552
(0.375) (0.394) (1.285)
N. auctions 9,257 3,640 1,165
R-squared 0.216 0.278 0.295
Goods fixed effects yes yes yes
Margin of victory no yes no
Province fixed effects yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes
City characteristics yes yes yes
Auction characteristics yes yes yes
Mayor characteristics yes yes yes
Electoral characteristics yes yes yes
Notes. Estimates on 2,978, 1,315, and 412 terms for the OLS, RD, and 2SLS estimates, respectively. In the 2SLS estimates
N. terms in office is instrumented with Elected before March 1993 as in Table 7. Winning Rebate is expressed as a percentage
discount from the the reserve price. Term limit binding is a dummy for whether the mayor can be reelected or not. Population
is the number of resident inhabitants at the beginning of the term, in 10,000. Reserve price is the reserve price set by the
contracting authority, in 100,000 euros (2000 equivalents). N. terms in office (party) is the tenure of the mayor’s party in
terms. When denoted with “yes”, regressions additionally include Margin of victory (3rd order polynomial in the margin
of victory ); Goods fixed effects (93 good or service characteristics dummies); Province fixed effects (102 dummies); Year
dummies (2000-2010 and an indicator for purchases after the introduction of CONSIP) refer to the year of bid delivery; City
characteristics (the budget balance deficit in percentage of the revenues at year level, judiciary efficiency at year-regional
level); Auction characteristics (squared term of the reserve price,1 selection mechanism dummy); Mayor characteristics (2
education dummies, 3 previous occupation dummies, a dummy for being born in the region); Electoral characteristics (a
dummy for being in the last year before the next election, 2 political party dummies, a dummy for previous experience in
council or executive committee). All mayoral and electoral characteristics are at the beginning of the term. Standard errors
are robust to clustering at the mayor level in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level
by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Figure 1: Outcomes, RD
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Notes. For values of MV smaller than zero, the mayor is at the first term, while for values above
zero the mayor is at the second term or more. The solid line is a running-mean smoothing (least
squares), separate on either side of the threshold; the dash line is a third-order polynomial fit,
separate on either side of the threshold.
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Figure 2: Distribution of the margin of victory, RD
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Notes. For values of MV smaller than zero, the mayor is at the first term, while for values above
zero the mayor is at the second term or more. Circles are average observed values, the bold solid
line is a kernel estimate (see McCrary, 2008), and the two thin lines are 95% confidence intervals.
The point estimate (standard error) of the discontinuity is -.18 (.13).
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Figure 3: Manipulation of the election timing around the March 1993 reform
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Appendix A: Extra Tables and Figures
Table A.1: Term limit and large cities, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: N. of bidders Winning rebate Winner local Max wins
same firm
N. terms in office -1.077** -0.505*** 0.029*** 0.019
(0.436) (0.196) (0.009) (0.012)
Term limit binding -2.051*** -0.710** -0.011 0.129***
(0.693) (0.307) (0.016) (0.018)
Term limit binding * large city 4.885*** 1.166*** -0.035*** -0.205***
(0.718) (0.243) (0.013) (0.012)
Population 0.058*** 0.046*** 0.000* -0.001***
(0.018) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000)
Reserve price 0.678*** 0.082*** -0.010*** -0.001***
(0.075) (0.011) (0.001) (0.000)
Female -0.456 -0.145 -0.007 -0.018
(0.714) (0.234) (0.013) (0.014)
Age 0.001 0.018** 0.000 -0.001***
(0.025) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000)
N. terms in office (party) -0.408 -0.290* 0.011 0.020**
(0.433) (0.165) (0.007) (0.008)
N. auctions 28,058 28,058 28,058 23,523
R-squared 0.237 0.484 0.099 0.348
Province fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
City characteristics yes yes yes yes
Auction characteristics yes yes yes yes
Mayor characteristics yes yes yes yes
Electoral characteristics yes yes yes yes
Notes. Estimates on 5,481 terms. N. of bidders is the number of firms that submitted a bid. Winning Rebate is expressed as
a percentage discount from the the reserve price. Winner local is a dummy for whether or not the winning firm is registered
in the same region. Max wins same firm is the highest percentage of public tenders assigned to the same firm within the
term. Term limit binding is a dummy for whether or not the mayor cannot be reelected, and large city is an indicator for the
population being larger than the Italian median (about 7,000 inhabitants). Population is the number of resident inhabitants
at the beginning of the term, in 10,000. Reserve price is the reserve price set by the contracting authority, in 100,000 euros
(2000 equivalents). N. terms in office (party) is the tenure of the mayor’s party in terms. When denoted with “yes”,
regressions additionally include Province fixed effects (102 dummies); Year dummies (2000-2004) refer to the year of bid
delivery; City characteristics (the budget balance deficit in percentage of the revenues at year level, judiciary efficiency at
year-regional level); Auction characteristics (squared term of the reserve price, 5 object characteristics dummies, 1 selection
mechanism dummy); Mayor characteristics (2 education dummies, 3 previous occupation dummies, a dummy for being
born in the region); Electoral characteristics (a dummy for being in the last year before the next election, 2 political party
dummies, a dummy for previous experience in council or executive committee). All mayoral and electoral characteristics are
at the beginning of the term. Standard errors are robust to clustering at the mayor level in parentheses. Significance at the
10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table A.2: Robustness, RD
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: N. of bidders Winning rebate Winner local Max wins
same firm
Pre-treatments -2.606*** -0.643 4.408** 4.570*
(1.009) (0.422) (2.082) (2.730)
Asymmetric -1.977 -1.625*** 0.549 7.579**
(1.778) (0.607) (3.419) (3.492)
4th order polynomial -2.448*** -0.761** 3.901* 5.230**
(0.937) (0.309) (2.169) (2.219)
3th order polynomial OB -2.257** -0.728** 3.868* 7.524**
(0.955) (0.334) (2.289) (3.394)
Local Linear OB -1.297 -0.724 -1.079 7.389*
(1.357) (0.454) (3.310) (3.948)
Notes. Coefficients on the number of terms in office at the discontinuity point. N. of bidders is the number of
firms that submitted a bid. Winning Rebate is expressed as a percentage discount from the the reserve price.
Winner local is a dummy for whether or not the winning firm is registered in the same region. Max wins same
firm is the highest percentage of public tenders assigned to the same firm within the term. Each of the rows
indicates a different specification of the empirical model: Pre-treatments (5 macro-area dummies, the number of
resident inhabitants at the beginning of the term; the city’s altitude above sea-level; the geographical extension
of the city administrative territory; an indicator of mayors born in the same region of the municipality; 2
education dummies, 3 previous occupation dummies, a dummy for being born in the region are included in the
baseline specification); Asymmetric (the interaction of the 3th order polynomial in the margin of victory with the
tenure indicator is included in the baseline specification); 4th order polynomial (a 4th order polynomial in the
margin of victory is included in the baseline specification); 3th order polynomial OB (the baseline specification
is estimated in the optimal bandwidth sample selected with the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2013) procedure);
Local Linear OB (an interaction of the tenure indicator and the margin of victory is included in the baseline
specification and it is estimated in the optimal bandwidth sample selected with the Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2013) procedure). All estimates (but Pre-treatments) include province fixed effects, year dummies, city, auction,
mayor and electoral characteristics as in Table A.1. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5%
level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table A.3: Placebo tests, RD
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: N. of bidders Winning rebate Winner local Max wins
same firm
MV > 0 -1.158 0.282 -0.185 -2.007
(1.822) (0.364) (2.366) (2.269)
MV < 0 3.215 -1.680* -9.581 14.194**
(2.938) (1.013) (7.224) (6.824)
Notes. Coefficients of the simulated number of terms in office at the discontinuity point. N. of bidders
is the number of firms that submitted a bid. Winning Rebate is expressed as a percentage discount from
the the reserve price. Winner local is a dummy for whether or not the winning firm is registered in the
same region. Max wins same firm is the highest percentage of public tenders assigned to the same firm
within the term. Regressions include a dummy for whether the mayor can be reelected or not; the 3rd
order polynomial in the margin of victory; the number of resident inhabitants at the beginning of the
term, in 10,000; the reserve price set by the contracting authority, in 100,000 euros (2000 equivalents);
the tenure of the mayor’s party in terms; 102 province fixed effects dummies); year dummies; the
budget balance deficit in percentage of the revenues at year level, and the judiciary efficiency at year-
regional level; the squared term of the reserve price, 5 object characteristics dummies, 1 selection
mechanism dummy; 2 mayors’ education dummies, 3 previous occupation dummies, a dummy for
being born in the region; a dummy for being in the last year before the next election, 2 political
party dummies, a dummy for previous experience in council or executive committee. All mayoral and
electoral characteristics are at the beginning of the term. Standard errors are robust to clustering at
the mayor level in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by
**, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table A.4: Balancing tests, RD
Coefficient on N. terms in office
at the discontinuity point
(1)
City characteristics:
North-West 0.069*
(0.04)
North-East -0.002
(0.03)
Center -0.089***
(0.03)
South 0.02
(0.04)
Islands 0.002
(0.016)
Population -1520.97
(5284.21)
Altitude -3.255
(22.241)
Extension -3.362
(4.458)
Mayor’s characteristics:
Female -0.015
(0.022)
Age 2.634***
(0.767)
Local 0.009
(0.021)
Education: College 0.044
(0.04)
Employment: Not employed 0.010
(0.026)
Employment: High-skilled 0.021
(0.035)
Previous experience -0.050
(0.041)
Incumbent party -0.007
(0.040)
N. mayors 2,195
Notes. All cities/mayors in the RD estimation sample. Altitude is the city’s
altitude above sea-level. Extension is the geographical extension of the city ad-
ministrative territory. Population is the Census population as of 1991. Local is
a dummy for being born in the same region. High-skilled includes entrepreneurs
and self-employed. Previous experience is a dummy for whether the mayor was
in the council or in the executive committee before. Incumbent party is a dummy
for whether the mayor belongs to the incumbent party. Significance at the 10%
level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table A.5: Balancing tests, 2SLS
Coefficient on being elected
before March 1993
(1)
Female -0.027
(0.020)
Age -1.867**
(0.756)
Local 0.008
(0.020)
Education: College -0.227***
(0.041)
Employment: Not employed -0.024
(0.019)
Employment: High-skilled -0.054
(0.034)
Previous experience -0.048
(0.043)
Incumbent party 0.010
(0.040)
N. mayors 1,722
Notes. All mayors in the 2SLS estimation sample. Local is a dummy for being
born in the same region. High-skilled includes entrepreneurs and self-employed.
Previous experience is a dummy for whether the mayor was in the council or in the
executive committee before. Incumbent party is a dummy for whether the mayor
belongs to the incumbent party. Significance at the 10% level is represented by
*, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table A.6: Tenure in office and the type of works
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Dependent variable: Schools Buildings Housing Art Other
Method: OLS RDD 2SLS OLS RDD 2SLS OLS RDD 2SLS OLS RDD 2SLS OLS RDD 2SLS
Mean outcome: 0.127 0.128 0.123 0.0523 0.0582 0.0613 0.0127 0.0149 0.0111 0.0383 0.0392 0.0417 0.540 0.525 0.524
N. terms in office -0.019*** -0.023 0.004 -0.003 -0.013 -0.021 0.002 0.008 -0.004 -0.006* -0.004 -0.006 0.029** 0.003 0.015
(0.007) (0.015) (0.018) (0.004) (0.011) (0.013) (0.003) (0.010) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008) (0.011) (0.014) (0.023) (0.029)
Term limit binding 0.012 -0.006 0.048* 0.004 -0.005 -0.004 0.001 -0.003 0.009 0.003 0.005 0.008 -0.022 0.070* -0.045
(0.010) (0.020) (0.026) (0.006) (0.015) (0.019) (0.004) (0.011) (0.009) (0.005) (0.010) (0.015) (0.019) (0.039) (0.049)
Population 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 -0.000 -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Reserve price 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001** 0.001** 0.001 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001* 0.002** 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female -0.000 0.004 0.022 0.005 0.009 0.015 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.011 0.014 0.015 -0.018
(0.009) (0.015) (0.017) (0.006) (0.009) (0.012) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.018) (0.025) (0.027)
Age 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N. terms in office (party) 0.003 0.002 -0.010 -0.001 -0.004 0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 0.001 -0.003 0.003 0.005 0.025* 0.025
(0.005) (0.008) (0.010) (0.003) (0.006) (0.008) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.014) (0.015)
N. auctions 28,058 12,688 9,016 28,058 12,688 9,016 28,058 12,688 9,016 28,058 12,688 9,016 28,058 12,688 9,016
R-squared 0.039 0.040 0.039 0.022 0.025 0.030 0.030 0.051 0.055 0.031 0.040 0.037 0.176 0.169 0.148
Margin of victory no yes no no yes no no yes no no yes no no yes no
Province fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
City characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Auction characteristics no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no
Mayor characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Electoral characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes. Estimates on 5,481, 2,269, and 1,783 terms for the OLS, RD, and 2SLS estimates, respectively. In the 2SLS estimates N. terms in office is instrumented with Elected
before March 1993 as in Table 7. Schools, Buildings, Housing, Art, and Other are dummies for whether the work is of a specific type. Reserve price is the reserve price set by the
contracting authority, in 100,000 euros (2000 equivalents). Term limit binding is a dummy for whether the mayor can be reelected or not. Population is the number of resident
inhabitants at the beginning of the term, in 10,000. N. terms in office (party) is the tenure of the mayor’s party in terms. When denoted with “yes”, regressions additionally
include Margin of victory (3rd order polynomial in the margin of victory ); Province fixed effects (102 dummies); Year dummies (2000-2004) refer to the year of bid delivery; City
characteristics (the budget balance deficit in percentage of the revenues at year level, judiciary efficiency at year-regional level); Auction characteristics (5 object characteristics
dummies, 1 selection mechanism dummy). In columns 4-9, we only include the selection mechanism dummy. Mayor characteristics (2 education dummies, 3 previous occupation
dummies, a dummy for being born in the region); Electoral characteristics (a dummy for being in the last year before the next election, 2 political party dummies, a dummy for
previous experience in council or executive committee). All mayoral and electoral characteristics are at the beginning of the term. Standard errors are robust to clustering at the
mayor level in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table A.7: Tenure in office and the number of auctions
(1) (2) (3)
Method: OLS RD 2SLS
Mean outcome: 5.119 5.295 5.057
N. terms in office -0.870*** -1.103** -0.865
(0.246) (0.436) (0.819)
Term limit binding 0.615 0.711 2.626***
(0.539) (0.881) (0.897)
Population 1.164*** 1.151*** 0.617**
(0.424) (0.422) (0.261)
Female -0.799 -0.776 0.575
(0.490) (0.527) (0.993)
Age 0.055*** 0.0568*** 0.096***
(0.020) (0.0215) (0.029)
N. terms in office (party) -0.754** -0.647* -0.344
(0.302) (0.333) (0.361)
N. terms 5,481 4,794 1,783
R-squared 0.311 0.316 0.312
Margin of victory no yes no
Province fixed effects yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes
City characteristics yes yes yes
Auction characteristics yes yes yes
Mayor characteristics yes yes yes
Electoral characteristics yes yes yes
Notes. Observations weighted by the number of auctions in the term. In the 2SLS estimates N. terms in office is instrumented
with Elected before March 1993 as in Table 7. Term limit binding is a dummy for whether the mayor can be reelected or
not. Population is the number of resident inhabitants at the beginning of the term, in 10,000. Reserve price is the reserve
price set by the contracting authority, in 100,000 euros (2000 equivalents). N. terms in office (party) is the tenure of the
mayor’s party in terms. When denoted with “yes”, regressions additionally include Margin of victory (3rd order polynomial
in the margin of victory ); Province fixed effects (102 dummies); Year dummies (2000-2010 and an indicator for purchases
after the introduction of CONSIP) refer to the year of bid delivery; City characteristics (the budget balance deficit in
percentage of the revenues at year level, judiciary efficiency at year-regional level); Auction characteristics (squared term
of the reserve price,1 selection mechanism dummy); Mayor characteristics (2 education dummies, 3 previous occupation
dummies, a dummy for being born in the region); Electoral characteristics (a dummy for being in the last year before the
next election, 2 political party dummies, a dummy for previous experience in council or executive committee). All mayoral
and electoral characteristics are at the beginning of the term, while all auction characteristics are term averages. Standard
errors are robust to clustering at the mayor level in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5%
level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Figure A.1: The awarding mechanism
Notes. Ravg is the average rebate expressed as a percentage reduction from
the reserve price. T, is the anomaly threshold obtained as the sum of Ravg
and the average deviation of the bids above Ravg . Rwin is the winning
rebate that minimizes the distance from below T.
Figure A.2: Correlation between n. of bidders and winning rebate
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Notes. Distribution of the Winning rebate (%) conditional on the N. of
bidders. Circles denote the minimum rebate; triangles the winning rebate;
diamonds the maximum rebate. Vertical lines denote the 95% confidence
intervals. Small works are projects with reserve price below 500,000 euros.
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Figure A.3: The introduction of the term limit
Notes. TL means that the term limit is binding. Dash lines indicate potential terms.
Figure A.4: Election timing
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Notes. The blue vertical line denotes the time of the electoral reform. Between red lines: the period
over which we have auction data. Early termination is before the beginning of the last year in
office because of: mayor’s resignation, vote of no confidence by 50% of either the council or the
executive committee. Early termination is computed on terms elected before 2003 only, otherwise
right censored.
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Figure A.5: Pre-determined city characteristics, RD
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Notes. For values of MV smaller than zero, the mayor is at the first term, while for values above
zero the mayor is at the second term or more. The solid line is a running-mean smoothing (least
squares), separate on either side of the threshold; the dash line is a third-order polynomial fit,
separate on either side of the threshold. Altitude is the city’s altitude above sea-level. Extension is
the geographical extension of the city administrative territory. Population is the Census population
as of 1991.
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Figure A.6: Pre-determined mayor characteristics, RD
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Notes. For values of MV smaller than zero, the mayor is at the first term, while for values above
zero the mayor is at the second term or more. The solid line is a running-mean smoothing (least
squares), separate on either side of the threshold; the dash line is a third-order polynomial fit,
separate on either side of the threshold. Local is a dummy for being born in the same region.
High-skilled includes entrepreneurs and self-employed. Previous experience is a dummy for whether
the mayor was in the council or in the executive committee before. Incumbent party is a dummy
for whether the incumbent party was majority in the previous term.
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Figure A.7: Mayor characteristics around the March 1993 reform
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Notes. The solid line is a running-mean smoothing least squares estimates, separate on either side
of the threshold. All mayors in the 2SLS estimation sample. High-skilled includes entrepreneurs and
self-employed. Local is a dummy for being born in the same region. Previous experience is a dummy
for whether or not the mayor was in the council or the executive committee before. Incumbent party
is a dummy for whether the incumbent party was majority in the previous term.
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Appendix B: Conceptual Framework
In this section we illustrate a simple theoretical model that we use to rationalize the
evidence on the effects of tenure in office on procurement outcomes. Figure B.1 describes
the time-line of the model for a generic period/auction t. Collusion takes place in a
sequence of two hypothetical stages, over infinitely many first-price auctions.36 In the first
stage, a new mayor searches for a collusive bidder. The mayor, in exchange for a bribe,
commits to reveal the highest bid and to allow the collusive bidder to adjust his bid. In
the second stage, the favored bidder can adjust his original bid and win, if the highest bid
was lower than his own private valuation. In this case, he earns the difference between
his valuation and the highest bid, minus the bribe. A long-lived relationship is settled
if the mayor is matched with a collusive bidder; otherwise in the next period/auction he
searches for another bidder. We illustrate the model by focusing on one generic sub-game
(t) and discuss the main assumptions. We then present the predictions of the model and
its implications.
2.1 Stage 1: Collusion/Search Game
At any point in time (t), for t = (1, 2, ...), a mayor is delegated by the principal (the
citizens) to run one sealed-bid first price auction.37 In each auction there are Nt bidders,
and entry is costless. The mayor is randomly matched with one of the Nt bidders. In
exchange for the promise of a bribe B > 0, he commits to reveal the highest bid and to let
the bidder adjust the bid after the auction takes place, as well as every future auction.38
The bribe is assumed to be fixed and exogenously determined.39 The mayor has no costs of
revealing the information, and can test only one bidder per auction. With probability pi he
is matched with a collusive bidder, i.e., a bidder who is willing to pay a bribe; otherwise he
is matched with a non-collusive bidder who is not willing to pay the bribe. In this simplified
setup, the mayor’s per-period expected revenues from collusion are strictly positive and
36In Section 5.1 we have documented that a significant fraction of term limited mayors (52%) is
later appointed either in the same administration (e.g., as councilor) or at higher offices (e.g., in a
province/regional/national administration). It is then plausible to assume that they actually face a
continuation game. Moreover, if the payoffs in the continuation game are large enough, collusion is still
an equilibrium even when the continuation probability is small (Mailath and Samuelson, 2006). Using the
available political and procurement data, we find that projects administered by provincial governments
are larger (an average reserve price of 650,000 euros).
37From now on, we will refer to a generic ascending auction, which is equivalent in its functioning to a
descending procurement auction.
38The agreement is reached in Stage 1, but the transfer in Stage 2 after the auction takes place.
39We do not have direct evidence of favoritism (bids adjustments, envelopes substitutions, or fake bids
submissions) and bribes’ exchanges as for example in Ferraz and Finan (2010), Ingraham (2005) and Tran
(2010). However, the cases of kickbacks in Italian procurement auctions, reported by newspapers, share
the same dynamics discussed in the literature.
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larger than the revenues from non collusion, as V mc = piB + (1 − pi)0 > V mnc = 0. Hence,
it is always optimal for the mayor to collude. If no collusion occurs then at the beginning
of period t+ 1 the mayor searches for another bidder.
The bidder’s decision problem is to choose whether to pay or not the bribe B. The
amount of the bribe is assumed to be fixed and exogenously determined. This decision
depends on the exogenous costs of collusion Cj: collusive bidders have low cost of collusion
CL, while non-collusive CH , with CH > CL. If the matched bidder is of a collusive type,
V bc > V
b
nc > 0 and paying B is always optimal (where V
b
c and V
b
nc are the expected
revenues from collusion and from a standard first price auction). If the matched bidder is
non-collusive, V bnc > (V
b
c −B) < 0 and he will never pay the bribe B.
2.2 Stage 2: Procurement Auctions with Collusion
At the beginning of each Stage 2, bidders’ valuations of the good νi are identically and
independently drawn from the c.d.f. F (ν), with support over the interval [ν, ν] within
the independent private value framework. F (ν) is assumed log concave, hence the ratio
α(νi) =
F (νi)
f(νi)
is increasing and bidders are risk neutral. There is no reserve price, and the
bidder with the highest bid is awarded the auction.
The core of this setup is the information structure. We denote by h(t) the public history
of the game. At the beginning of every period/auction, the Nt − 1 non-favored bidders
learn t, the time the mayor has been in office. This information is publicly known, likewise
the proportion of collusive bidders in the population pi. Bidders use this information to
compute P t = 1 − (1 − pi)t, the probability that the mayor has found a collusive bidder
after t independent trials, which is increasing in t. The auction, therefore, is asymmetric:
with probability P t there is one favored bidder, and with 1 − P t there are Nt − 1 non-
favored bidders. To avoid both explicit and tacit collusion between bidders, we assume
that bidders do not communicate and that the identity of present and past winners is not
immediately observed (Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn, 2004). We also restrict the attention
to equilibria where players’ bids depend only on their current valuation and the public
history of the game. This is equivalent to assume that at every auction there is a new set
of non-collusive bidders replaced, for example because they rotate across municipalities.40
The auction proceeds as follows. A favored bidder (denoted by c) is allowed to observe
the highest bid bh, and may opt to adjust his original bid and set bc = bh + ε if this is
lower than his valuation, vc. The Nt− 1 other bidders are all symmetric, and their beliefs
about the collusive bidder are reflected in Pt. Bidding is guaranteed by the fact that some
of the Nt − 1 bidders in any auction may value the good more than the colluded bidder.
40This assumption is compatible with the requirements of the procurement law that prescribes contrac-
tors to submit financial guarantees before bidding. Depending on their assets, contractors, might then be
limited in the possibility of participating in succeeding auctions.
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Assuming that the expected continuation payoffs of winning or losing the auction
for the non-collusive bidders are the same as in a one-shot game, we describe the per-
period bidding behavior of the Nt − 1 non-favored bidders. A non-favored bidder solves a
maximization problem according to a strictly increasing inverse bidding function φ(·):41
max
b
(νi − b) [Pt(F (φ(b))(N−2)F (b) + (1− Pt)(F (φ(b))(N−1)] (5)
where the term in square brackets is the probability that a non-favored bidder i wins the
auction by bidding b, F (·)(N−2) is the probability that a non-favored bidder defeats the
N − 2 honest rivals, and F (b) is the probability of defeating the favored bidder.
We consider a symmetric equilibrium where νi = φ(b) for all the non-favored bidders.
Given the information structure, we can consider each auction as independent and use the
results from Arozamena and Weinschelbaum (2009). If α(ν) = F (ν)
f(ν)
is strictly concave,
then φt(b) < φt+1(b), as φt(b) is strictly increasing in t for all b > ν, and the per-period
expected revenues of the auction (the per-period coalition’s expected utility) are decreasing
(increasing) when 0 ≤ Pt < Pt+1 ≤ 1.
After the auction is concluded, with some exogenous probability the term ends, and
with the complementary probability the mayor continues in office and runs one more
auction in the next period.
This simplified model only considers the case in which the mayor reciprocates the bribe
by showing the highest bid to the colluded bidder, then allowing that bidder to adjust his
price. Other equivalent mechanisms could be considered, though. For example, the mayor
could grant the collusive bidder ex-post favorable renegotiations relative to the original
contract, both in terms of time to delivery and costs. In this way, the colluded bidder
can bid more aggressively, even above its valuation, and win the auction with a higher
probability than if all firms were equally competitive.
2.3 Predictions
In this model an equilibrium is defined by the mayor, the favored bidder, and the non-
favored bidders optimization problems, plus the commonly known probability of collusion
Pt. A public perfect Bayes-Nash equilibrium exists because: it is always optimal for the
mayor to ask for a bribe; ii) it is optimal for the collusive bidder to pay the bribe; iii) the
equilibrium bidding function of non-favored bidders maximizes equation (5) in a perfect
Bayes-Nash Equilibrium; (iv) it is optimal for non-collusive bidders not to pay the bribe.
As long as P t is increasing in t, one potential equilibrium of the model is characterized by a
gradual diffusion of collusion over periods/auctions, where in each following period/auction
41For the average bid auction framework, this assumption is supported by the experimental evidence of
Chang et al. (2014).
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non-colluded bidders learn the probability that the mayor has found a colluded bidder,
and behave accordingly.42 The model delivers the following predictions:
Prediction 1 As the mayor’s tenure in office increases, the probability that auctions are
assigned to the same bidder increases.
Proof. By construction of Pt, if 0 < pi < 1 then Pt+1 > Pt.
Prediction 2 As the mayor’s tenure in office increases, the revenues from the auction
decrease.
Proof. This follows from the results of Proposition 3, pg. 651 of Arozamena and Wein-
schelbaum (2009) as in our setup each auction can be treated as independent and
the increase in Pt exogenously determined by the time in office of the mayor.
In presence of entry costs, the number of bidders may also depend on the mayor’s
tenure in office. The main intuition is that non-favored bidders will enter up to the point
where their expected profit is larger than the entry cost k, with k > 0 (Menezes and
Monteiro, 2000). Since Pt+1 > Pt, the expected profits of non-colluded bidders should also
decrease with t, thus reducing the participation of less efficient bidders. Therefore, when
entry is costly we expect that:
Prediction 3 As the mayor’s tenure in office increases, the number of bidders per auction
decreases.
We also enrich the model by arguing that local bidders might have lower costs of bribing
(or lower entry costs), i.e., they find easier to pay the bribe to the mayor (Garicano et
al., 2005). If types (local or not) are not perfectly observed before the first interaction, it
follows that:
Prediction 4 As the mayor’s tenure in office increases, the probability that the winner is
local increases.
Finally, we extend the model and consider the effect of a policy that removes the mayor
from politics at the end of every period (a one period term limit in politics). Since in this
new scenario the structure of the game is the same, we can focus on the probability of
42A more sophisticated equilibrium should consider the role of citizens/voters (the principal) in disci-
plining mayors (the agent) granting or not reelection. This would clearly enrich the dynamics of the model
and the number of testable predictions, at the price of complicating the analysis of collusive dynamics. We
leave this extension to further research, while addressing its empirical implications in Section 4. There,
we discussed how the interaction between mayors and voters could bias our empirical analysis, and how
our identification strategy allows us to take voters’ behavior as exogenous.
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collusion computed by the non-favored bidders (P t = 1 − (1 − pi)t). Accordingly, every
period non-favored bidders know that the mayor is new mayor (t = 1) and matches with
a collusive bidder with probability (pi), so the model predicts:
Prediction 5 A policy that rotates the mayor every period delivers a constant level of
collusion, and the outcomes of the auctions are constant over time.
Proof. It is a sequence of one shot games with Pt = P1 = pi, which is constant ∀ t.
As a concluding remark, notice that the model considered the possibility of favoritism
as in first-price auctions, while to be more coherent with the Italian institutional setting
the model should consider that the winner of the auction is the one who bids the highest
value below the averaged-average (see Section 2). However, even in this set-up non-favored
bidders will compete against a favored bidder, who eventually observes a particular mo-
ment of the distribution of the bids (the averaged-average bid, instead of the highest bid),
and may adjust and win. For this reason, we believe that a more complicated model would
not give qualitatively different predictions from the one we propose.
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Figure B.1: The Time-line of the model
Notes. pi is the proportion of colluded bidders in the population. νi is the individual evaluation.
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